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Introduction 
 
In modern society, the capability to ensure an adequate level of security to persons and 
infrastructures is essential for the development of a territory. Malicious acts, including 
aggressions, intrusions, sabotages, and terrorist attacks as well as adverse natural 
events can pose a threat to the physical security. The protection against these threats is 
a need as well as a requirement in many application domains, including a wide range 
of industry and government sectors across the globe. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) and Homeland Security (HS) are just a few of the possible examples. Whatever 
the application domain, the security of any asset – especially if it concerns complex, 
extended and critical environments – passes through the adequate use of protection 
technologies, techniques, tools, and methodologies, suitable for monitoring tasks and 
aimed at an intelligent surveillance.  
The physical security of such environments requires the development of innovative 
approaches for identification, detection and mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities and 
risks. Therefore, it represents an area in which practical needs (e.g. coming from 
industry), technological resources (e.g. belonging to physical security market) and 
scientific research (e.g. on information fusion strategies and event correlation 
techniques) converge all together .         
The events of September 11, 2001 brought a rapid expansion of research efforts in that 
direction, in particular to prevent terrorist acts, minimize the damage and recover from 
disruptive events. Infrastructure protection against potential threats is usually 
performed by surveillance systems that are more and more large, distributed and 
heterogeneous. The cyber-physical and human-in-the-loop nature of this field requires 
a set of multidisciplinary activities to be performed in order to adopt appropriate and 
effective protection mechanisms. Due to the variety of natural and malicious threat 
scenarios, a growing set of different sensing technologies is required. However, many 
of the developed innovative technologies (e.g. video analytics) do not always provide 
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adequate intelligence and reliability. On the contrary, the evolution of end-user 
requirements increasingly calls for enhanced early warning capabilities and  superior 
situation awareness, which the traditional technologies and systems cannot provide.  
An effective information integration and management is essential to overcome 
technological limitations, synthesizing data from multiple alerting systems and 
physical sensors. Thanks to appropriate methodologies and techniques, the 
exploitation of distributed and heterogeneous sensorial subsystems (encouraged also 
by the development of novel low-cost devices) can lead to several levels of event 
correlation.  At low level, the development of multi-modal approaches for monitoring 
and surveillance activities helps in providing advanced event detection capabilities 
and/or in improving detection reliability. At a higher level, information aggregation is 
also the key to develop the next generation of security management systems, the so 
called PSIM (Physical Security Information Management) systems. PSIM systems 
help to integrate security devices, to improve detection efficiency and effectiveness, 
and to produce an increased situation awareness. The main factor to achieve those 
results is the presentation of all the relevant information into a single view together 
with essential decision support features. 
At the same time, the protection of many infrastructures – which could be “open”, 
spread through hundreds of kilometres, and vulnerable to many threats of various kind 
and seriousness – may require hundreds or thousands of cameras and other sensors, 
which makes human-based surveillance unfeasible. Furthermore, the detection of 
specific events or activities almost completely relies on costly and scarce human 
resources. Manual analysis of video as well as diverse sensor alarms (which can be 
false) is labour intensive, fatiguing, and prone to errors. Additionally, psychophysical 
research indicates that there are severe limitations in the ability of humans to monitor 
simultaneous signals. Thus, it is clear that there is a fundamental contradiction 
between the current surveillance model and human surveillance capabilities.  
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In such a context, the novel research must aim at recognizing threats scenarios as early 
as possible, providing superior situation awareness and decision support, in order to 
quickly – possibly automatically – activate response-and-recovery strategies. The 
thesis addresses that issue on different levels:  
 At a methodological level, we have proposed the proper use of ad-hoc 
information fusion strategies, which contribute to define the general and 
challenging paradigm of “augmented surveillance”. Its declination in a specific 
domain should help in exploiting technologies, capabilities and tools (already  
available in the state-of-the-art), in order to perform functions of different 
complexity.   
 At the application level, we have developed a framework aimed at the 
automatic and early detection of threats against infrastructures, by performing 
a model-based logical, spatial and temporal correlation of basic events detected 
by the sensorial subsystems. The design of a proper detection engine is the key 
to set up an effective reasoning on heterogeneous data and to implement an 
application of fusion. It is also the result of the search for a light, efficient and 
easy-to-use approach, obtained by properly selecting models and correlation 
techniques.       
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides the state-of-the-art and open 
issues in information integration, fusion and management in the specific context of 
physical security. The chapter describe the main resources available, coming from the 
industry and scientific research fields, to address the posed problems.  
Chapter 2 describes the main requirements of the methodological approach to the 
physical security. The fulfilment of such requirements is fundamental to conceive 
solutions that should be effective as well as viable. The chapter also describes how to 
use the information fusion strategies in defining the “augmented surveillance” 
paradigm. 
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Chapter 3 introduces the basic motivation, the working logic and the architecture of 
DETECT (DEcision Triggering Event Composer & Tracker), the framework we have 
developed for the automatic detection of the physical security threats, possibly before 
they can evolve. It operates by performing a model-based logical, spatial and temporal 
correlation of basic events, detected by each monitoring device or subsystem.  
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 address the main limitations of the approach on which 
DETECT is based. In fact, it is deterministic and takes into account a pre-defined 
knowledge base. Therefore, in order to improve the detection effectiveness, a heuristic 
recognition, based on the computation of “distances” between threat scenarios, has 
been proposed. The distances are defined using ad-hoc metrics for the detection 
models of DETECT. At the same time, in order to improve the detection effectiveness, 
we have described how to handle and elaborate the main sources of uncertainty, which 
include sensors and models. The aim is to quantify the detection reliability level, in 
order to improve the decision support in triggering response actions and to control the 
rate of false alarms. 
Chapter 6 presents some applications of the additional features provided by DETECT 
in a specific field, like the railway and mass-transit domain. More in detail, it includes  
examples of threat modeling and real-time computation of distances and alarm 
reliability for some threats of reference.    
Chapter 7, finally, describes the working principles and advantages of an overall 
integration of DETECT with a PSIM system. In particular it presents the integration 
with the existing Security Management System (SMS), developed by Ansaldo STS. It 
represents the concrete attempt to solve a well-known class of problems, which 
involve most of the actors moving in the physical security landscape.      
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Chapter 1  
State-of-the-art and open issues in information 
integration, fusion and management for physical 
security  
 
Security is “the state of being free from danger or threat”. According to that definition 
provided by the Oxford English Dictionary, the security is a condition related to the 
degree of protection from threats, concerning any person, community, organization, or 
nation. More in detail, the concept can be applied to any asset, which has a certain 
vulnerability to given threats and therefore a certain level of risk. In modern society, 
the development of a territory is increasingly tied to the capability to ensure an 
adequate level of security to persons and infrastructures. Criminal acts, including 
aggressions, sabotages, and terrorist attacks as well as accidents and adverse natural 
events can pose a threat to the physical security. The protection against these threats is 
a need as well as a requirement in many application domains.   
Today, more than ever, the welfare, the quality of life and all the vital functions of a 
country increasingly depend on the continuous and coordinated operation of several 
infrastructures, which for their importance are defined as Critical Infrastructures (CIs). 
The main CIs belong to Transport, Energy and Telecommunication networks, however 
the list include a disparate set of sectors, depending on the indications of each 
government (in the European Union area, the guidelines for all the member states are 
defined by the European Commission). The physical security of such infrastructures 
requires the development of innovative approaches for identification, detection and 
mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities and risks. The same approach involves a wide 
range of industry and government sectors across the globe: Homeland Security, 
Defense, Law Enforcement, Corporate Security, etc. The events of September 11, 
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2001 brought a rapid expansion of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) efforts, in 
particular to prevent terrorist acts, minimize the damage and recover from disruptive 
events.  
Whatever the application domain, the security of any asset – especially if it concerns 
complex, extended and critical environments – passes through the adequate use of 
protection technologies, techniques and methodologies, suitable for monitoring tasks 
aimed at an intelligent surveillance. The description which follows is biased in that 
direction. 
 
1.1 Integration and management of physical security systems   
The evolving requirements to be fulfilled in surveillance applications increasingly call 
for the deployment of intelligent and automated monitoring solutions. Also, the 
growing capabilities assured by the technological progress encourage the employment 
of advanced surveillance systems. Although nowadays video surveillance represents 
the most popular form of surveillance, there are many other forms of monitoring. 
Given the size and complexity of the sensed environments, it is easy to understand that 
modern surveillance cannot be performed via cameras only, but should include 
multiple modalities. Each monitored area offers different information streams, which 
need to be captured, evaluated and possibly correlated. According to the specific 
application, an ad-hoc set of heterogeneous sensing technologies is required.  
Today the physical security industry is complex and reasonably mature. The main 
technologies include video surveillance (possibly including video analytics), intrusion 
detection, access control, intelligent sound detection, CBRNe (Chemical Biological 
Radiological Nuclear explosive) agent detection, and many others [30]. On the other 
hand, most basic systems can include for example temperature, humidity or pressure 
sensors. However, with respect to the information integration and management, the 
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industry is still underdeveloped. From this point of view, the scientific community is 
recognized as a valuable resource for the introduction of new solutions.  
In practical applications, each monitoring system is handled by means of an ad-hoc 
software platform. The traditional surveillance solutions include, for example, VMS 
(Video Management System), ACS (Access Control System), etc. They provide an 
overview of the installed devices (with a related report of diagnostic, warning, and 
alert messages) and a set of basic functionalities (e.g. for data acquisition, control, 
configuration, rules setting). However, in this way each event is treated separately 
with a lack of an effective information sharing. Therefore, the result is a very 
fragmented approach to the physical security. Assuming the use of multiple security 
systems and a remote surveillance of each of them from a control centre, the possible 
consequences are the following:  
a. a human operator at the control centre may be inundated of warning messages, 
coming from multiple separated interfaces (one for each management system 
of the single technology);  
b. given the limited detection reliability of each triggered alarm (due to the 
limited reliability of any technology), it is necessary as well as complex to 
evaluate and confirm each of them;  
c. for the ones confirmed, the capability in quickly understanding the criticality 
level (and to know if there is one more critical than others) is very low;  
d. for each detected alarm, the quick activation of ad-hoc response procedures 
(possibly considering first the ones with higher priority) is not adequately 
supported.  
As one can see, within the situation management task, the events contextualization is 
crucial. Generally speaking, video streams can provide a context (and then a 
“meaning”) for all security data. For example, in a public building, if the intrusion 
detection system detects an event in correspondence of an emergency exit, it may be 
associated to a person who exited the door unintentionally or to a terrorist who is 
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preparing an attack. In fact, the system provides an alert, but no context. Only viewing 
the video stream related to the camera at the emergency exit, the severity of the 
situation can be evaluated and a countermeasure can be adopted. Although such a 
principle is intuitive, its practical application in traditional surveillance approach is not 
so immediate.  
 
1.1.1 Physical security information integration 
Current research tends to combine and to exploit multiple modalities of monitoring, in 
order to create  distributed surveillance solutions, including not only multi-camera 
systems [3], but more in general multi-sensor surveillance systems [83]. The 
combination of traditional video surveillance with other smart sensing technologies 
(see also [72]) leads to the development of new multimedia surveillance systems [20], 
which collect and process different information streams (audio, video, and any output 
of a sensor). To that aim, a proper integration (e.g. by means of diverse algorithms) of 
these information is required [30]. Therefore, a multimodal and multimedia solutions 
combine two characteristics:  
 the use of multiple sensors, possibly with overlapping sensing areas and which 
communicate between them through a network;  
 the use of heterogeneous sensors, to exploit all the information available in the 
monitored area.  
The most advanced forms of multimedia and multimodal surveillance are the answers 
to different needs: to overcome specific limitations of the single modality (e.g. video 
analytics algorithms suffer from several problems); to improve the event detection 
reliability, which is crucial in determining viability and effectiveness of surveillance 
systems; to extend the capabilities in detecting complex events, considering also the 
evolution of end-user requirements.  
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The integration of heterogeneous sensors within a multimedia and multimodal 
surveillance system is the key to address the issues described above. Regarding the 
integration approaches, they can be classified in two categories: bottom-up and top-
down. Bottom-up approaches are aimed at developing ad-hoc integration algorithms 
whose inputs are the outputs of the sensors to be integrated. In such a case, the 
algorithm executed by sensors is written without using information coming from other 
sensors. Hence the whole integration logic lies at a higher level of abstraction. 
Typically, the approach addresses the need for improving the overall performance of 
the surveillance system by trying to reduce false alarm rate (named FAR), and to add 
functionalities. Top-down approaches are aimed at developing the algorithms executed 
by the sensors, using the information coming from other devices. In this case, sensor 
output depends on the presence of other sensors and on the information they provide. 
Therefore, there is a part of the integration logic to be implemented in each sensing 
device, i.e. at a lower level of abstraction. Typically, this approach is conceived to 
improve reliability of detection (represented by a parameter named POD, Probability 
Of Detection). For example, in video analytics applications, the object detection and 
tracking performed by the single camera can be improved by means of additional 
information from other cameras or sensors.  
Some examples of multimedia and multimodal surveillance are described as follows. 
Audio surveillance (see also [62], [63], and [64]) can be auxiliary to video surveillance 
in solving specific problems like the tracking of people in case of occlusions 
(correlation among unobserved audio and video) or the identification of a region of 
interest by a camera (correlation among observed audio and video) [48][77].  
A network of PIR (Passive InfraRed) sensors can support object and motion detection, 
performed by the video analytics. This is particularly important when the classic 
methods based on shape and colour recognition fail because of the limited field of 
view of cameras, or when they are deployed in places with very different lighting 
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conditions. Thus, PIR sensors can be used to detect motion with a high accuracy (also 
during the night), since they are not sensitive to light conditions [66]. 
Furthermore, laser technologies  like the LDV (Laser Doppler Vibrometer), can be 
used to remotely capture acoustic signals like human speech (since performs a 
vibration detection within two hundred meters). An integrated system with multiple 
cameras and LDVs can represent an advanced form of multimodal surveillance for 
face and voice recognition systems [67] [84]. Another laser based system that comes 
in support to the video analysis is the LIDS (Laser Intrusion Detection System). For 
example, it can be applied to protect areas from intrusions, and to monitor of portals 
and tunnels in order to detect unauthorized objects or people. By managing known 
profiles, which can be recognized by the system without triggering a warning, LIDS is 
able to reduce the rate of nuisance alarms. The insensitivity to lighting conditions, 
reflective surfaces, rain, and snow has a great impact on reducing the false alarm rate 
with respect to video surveillance. Possible applications include also platform line 
crossing and intrusions (accidental or malicious) onto the track in a railway context. 
Therefore, these systems offer both an effective support for visual analysis and 
additional information which can be correlated with data coming from intelligent 
video surveillance [41]. A survey on multi-sensor integration for wide-area 
surveillance is provided in [1].  
As described, multimodal monitoring forms represent suitable solutions for complex 
and/or crowded environments. However, they don’t represent the cure for everything. 
Besides, some benefits are counteracted by problems, like the harder camera 
calibration and configuration (to adequately fulfil the overall task); and the more 
complex management of available cameras, which is fundamental in performing 
functions like the object tracking from one camera to the next, when it is necessary to 
establish a correspondence using common reference points. 
In many practical applications, the multiple sensing systems are integrated at junction-
box level, the first point of aggregation of the detected signals. The result is a low 
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level integration, which allows a more immediate and reliable data correlation, but that 
is characterized by several disadvantages. The integration may be more difficult for 
the different representations (and semantic levels) of the combined modalities (e.g. 
audio and video), while the scalability of the solution is very limited. 
 
1.1.2 Physical security information management  
The limitations related to the traditional management systems of the single 
technologies (e.g. VMS, ACS, etc.) and to the multimodal monitoring solutions, 
highlight the need for a different – and possibly more cohesive – approach to address 
the overall information integration and management, especially in the context in which 
we move. 
Regarding the integration, if each system works within their own confines to perform 
a defined task and there is no knowledge of each other, the absence of interactivity 
leads to a limited effectiveness in the use of available information. On the other hand, 
with a limited capability to manage technologies and related information flows, as 
end-users continue to add data into the security information flow, the more they have 
reduced means to manage and to use that data. Thus, the flow is increasingly big and 
heterogeneous, while the security departments (regardless of public or private 
organization) get larger and more inefficient. The consequences are a higher cost for 
the security, which is increasingly more difficult to justify, and an organizational 
inefficiency, which leads to a false sense of security.     
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Figure 1 – Progression path in physical security information management 
A real picture of current situation is in Figure 1, which shows the progression path of 
security and technology maturity through seven stages, beginning with a single vendor 
environment and evolving to a system that provides a complete view of situations 
(also across multiple organizations). As reported in figure, in most of the cases (almost 
60%), public and private organizations are still in the second stage, i.e. the physical 
security is addressed using multiple technologies, individually managed [79]. In such 
a scenario, to get the right information to the right people at the right time is not 
possible.  
Ad-hoc information aggregation and management are paving the way to a new 
generation of PSIM (Physical Security Information Management) systems, capable to 
address the following requirements [68]:  
 device level information from a wide set of disparate security systems, which 
may incorporate products of more independent manufacturers, should be 
gathered;  
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 given the possible size and complexity of infrastructures, a great amount of 
information should be evaluated in order to recognize and prioritize critical 
situations;  
 the overall monitored situation should be presented to human operators in a 
clear, concise and comprehensive format, enabling an accurate and quick 
confirmation of the alarms;  
 procedures and step-by-step instructions should be triggered to respond to the 
confirmed alarms;  
 all the activities should be tracked and recorded to aid compliance management 
and to enable post-event investigative analysis.  
They represent the five key functionalities that a PSIM system should include, in order 
to provide a complete Situation Assessment and Situation Management, to effectively 
manage any security-related event or emergency in real-time and across any 
organization.  
After the terrorist attack on the 11
th
 September 2001, it was evident that the correct 
interpretation and the consistent response, with respect to many critical events at the 
same time, could not be left to human operators only. In particular, the emergency 
response of the traditional security management systems had to be improved. The 
PSIM acronym was born approximately in 2005, to tag the systems able to support the 
analysis and the automated decision making, and not only to gather and present 
information coming from the devices, like in the traditional approaches [68]. 
Obviously, the quick and punctual activation of response procedures, depending on 
priorities and criticality levels of the events, can significantly improve the overall 
impact of countermeasures.            
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Figure 2 – PSIM key capabilities 
As already mentioned, the main capabilities of a PSIM system include: a) gathering of 
data and information from the field; b) analysis and interpretation of received data, 
events and alarms; c) confirmation about the authenticity of the alarms; d) resolution 
of critical situations and possible emergencies in real-time; e) reporting of all the 
tracked information (see Figure 2).  
The basic concept behind PSIM is not new, in fact it applies the experience from the 
software and network security areas to the physical security to optimize devices 
integration, analysis and end-to-end situation management and resolution. More in 
detail, PSIM is analogous to SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) 
software. It does for physical security what SIEM does for cyber security, simplifying 
the surveillance task, while improving security and reducing the time, cost and effort 
that physical security requires [80].  
 
High level architecture 
One of the key objectives of a PSIM system is to integrate diverse systems into a 
common information model. From this viewpoint, PSIM provides a platform to 
connect any number and type of security devices or systems and advanced processing 
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capabilities of the device information. A plug-and-play approach with robust SDKs 
(Software Development Kits) and APIs (Application Programming Interfaces), make 
the integration with new subsystems (e.g. intelligent video surveillance, biometric 
access control, CBRNe detection, etc.) quick and seamless.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Modular PSIM architecture 
In addition to that, the key components of a PSIM solution are the engines that 
translate data (from physical security subsystems) into intelligence [53]. These engines 
represent the main resource to identify, analyze and prioritize situations. They also 
ensures that all appropriate information is presented to an operator in an integrated 
display, aiding him/her in focusing on the situation (e.g. the possible threat) and not on 
the technology. From this point of view, with reference to one of the most common 
technologies, it is worth noting that PSIM incorporates, but also transcends the video 
alerts.  
16 
 
Figure 3 shows a generic architecture of a PSIM platform, which enable the 
connection with a disparate set of security devices through pluggable modules [80]. 
They can range from video surveillance components, access control, CBRNe sensors, 
to other systems that are in a certain way security-related, although they are not strictly 
security systems. Some examples are: GPS (Global Positioning System), Fire alarm, 
Building Management (e.g. elevator, HVAC
1
, lighting), etc. The Adaption and 
Connectivity layer receives data through various protocols, SDKs, and APIs and 
creates a “common language” for security information. Such a language enables the 
processing performed at higher levels. Obviously the type of adaptation depends on 
the type of outputs of the integrated sensing subsystems, and on their possible 
capability to perform this task on their own.  
The translation of data into intelligence is possible thanks to ad-hoc processing and 
correlation of captured information. According to the specific application, a set of 
engines can support the task. For example, a geospatial engine can provide location 
awareness of devices and support mapping functionalities (e.g. rules can be set such 
that multiple alarms from one location can be correlated). A routing engine can 
optimize the use of the network resources. A rules engine can analyze and correlate 
events from multiple sources, in order to infer new knowledge about the overall 
situation and better support decisions. A dispatch engine can activate external 
transmission of messages and commands, also depending on the indications of rules 
engine, since it executes recommendations for situation resolution. Finally, 
information integration and management imply a number of activities which are 
usually performed by means of a set of tools, e.g. including display and video wall 
systems. All the equipments can be effectively managed by a unified user interface, 
thereby making situation assessment and management simpler, and reducing reaction 
time in case of critical events. 
 
                                                 
1
 The acronym HVAC stands for Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
2
 An example of guideline is provided by the chart “PSIM vs. VMS: what do you need?” prepared by 
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“True” and “Lite” PSIM  
PSIM represents a form of integrated management, but not all the forms of integrated 
management correspond to a PSIM solution, in particular because the final objective is 
to integrate many independent subsystems (possibly of different manufacturers) which 
were not designed to be integrated. The management systems of the single 
technologies (e.g. VMS, ACS, etc.) have developed quickly in recent years and they 
represent very powerful security solutions. However, it is important to explicit the 
difference between these “lite” solutions and the “true” PSIM ones, which feature (at 
least) the five key capabilities in Figure 2. One of the main doubts about PSIM’s 
adoption is precisely due to the confusion on what it is and what it does [46]. Part of 
the reason is that VMS or ACS vendors tend to blur the confines between “lite” and 
“true” PSIM, in the attempt to extend the market of their own products [68]. 
Many VMSs have interfaces to other physical security systems (e.g. access control, 
intrusion detection, fire alarms), but most of them don’t seamlessly  integrate with 
competing software. The “true” PSIM solution is an open system, independent from 
the specific vendors of the technologies. If a PSIM system was totally based on an 
certain VMS/ACS product able to integrate other systems, its degree of openness 
would be highly reduced. In fact, it is quite obvious that a system manufacturer will 
not share its know-how with a company which could be its competitor. For example, if 
the PSIM vendor also produces cameras, it is quite difficult to find a further third party 
provider for cameras and/or VMS to be integrated. Therefore a “lite” PSIM system 
(also named Tier 2 or 3 systems [36][68]) could became isolated over the years, and 
the end-users could not have the interoperability they believed to have. On the other 
hand, a “true” PSIM system should integrate most of physical security systems. The 
interfaces are typically “one-and-done”, i.e. once developed they are part of a library. 
A critical issue can arise when the provider has to develop them for the first time, 
because of the related cost. At the same time, end-users don’t like to be the first ones 
for which new interfaces are deployed (e.g. they prefer more consolidated integrated 
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platforms). The consequence is that PSIM vendors tend to develop their market in 
specific verticals: transportation (railway, airport and seaport), defense, homeland 
security or other critical infrastructures. Therefore, the main differences between the 
vendors are in their expertise in a specific application domain and in supporting 
specific security systems for that domain.       
In addition to that, the lack of the lite solutions in data analysis complicates the 
decision making of human operators, and their reactivity. In such a process, speed and 
accuracy are crucial to avoid service interruptions, dangerous domino effects, financial 
damages, and to save assets or even lives. 
Finally, unlike lite systems, PSIM systems have a high scalability. In extended 
infrastructures, this means also a greater capability in providing an effective resilience, 
service continuity and crisis management.   
Despite the added value that a PSIM system should have, the mentioned aspects don’t 
mean that a “true” PSIM solution is the best in any case. Of course it depends on the 
requirements coming from the specific end-user, which operates in a certain 
application domain. For example, there are ad-hoc guidelines (for end-users) to 
determine whether a VMS or a PSIM is a better fit according to the needs
2
. From the 
functional point of view, the following points allow for a proper comparison:  
 PSIM may depend on video streams provided by a VMS, but it doesn’t 
substitute for a VMS. PSIM doesn’t record or manage video, but can manage 
situations and possibly critical events; 
 VMS can offer a basic form of situation awareness, e.g. if it is integrated with 
an ACS. In that case VMS is able to report an alarm from a camera or an 
access control device. Once received it is acknowledged by an operator and the 
process stops. From this point, unlike VMS, PSIM begins to support a real-
time situation awareness and management as the criticality evolves (e.g. it can 
                                                 
2
 An example of guideline is provided by the chart “PSIM vs. VMS: what do you need?” prepared by 
Bob Banerjee, NICE Systems 
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correlate the incoming alarms with the previous ones, instead of issuing a new 
notification, and automatically associate an ad-hoc emergency procedure to 
resolve the criticality);   
 PSIM can address compliance issues (e.g. with respect to CIP programs and 
regulations), using automated workflows and incident reporting capabilities. At 
the same time, unlike VMS/ACS, it can ensure business continuity and help in 
implementing contingency plans; 
 PSIM could not be exclusively dedicated to security-related events. In fact, 
more in general, it can enable an operational situation awareness.       
 
1.2 Information fusion strategies 
1.2.1 The need for an overall process model 
Multimodal and multimedia surveillance is aimed at providing complementary 
information and at increasing the accuracy in detecting threats and/or events of 
interest. Indeed, it is easy to understand that by exploiting multiple features from the 
monitored area, the power of event detection is greater than the one assured by a 
single source. However, in order to recognize in real-time complex situation patterns, 
to build hypotheses of unfolding situations, and to take actions in response to these 
situations, the overall capabilities of the surveillance system should include 
processing, correlation and handling of multimedia data coming from different 
sources.  
At the same time, because of the variety of natural and malicious threat scenarios, a 
growing set of different sensing technologies can be required. Unfortunately, many of 
the recently developed innovative technologies (e.g. video analytics) do not always 
provide adequate reliability (see e.g. [40][55]). Many automatic detection systems 
generates unnecessary warnings, which can be classified as false alarms or nuisance 
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alarms. Especially with regard to the decision support feature of surveillance systems 
(e.g. for triggering countermeasures), it is very important to control the rate of these 
alarms (see e.g. [13]).  
The integration of information coming from different sources represents the basic  
concept behind the new generations of surveillance solutions, where many different 
media streams contribute to provide a greater situational awareness, an improved early 
warning capability, and a better decision support. Whereas the capabilities of the 
traditional systems are limited in data analysis and interpretation, and hence in real-
time prevention and reaction. Furthermore, since a few human operators are usually 
employed in security surveillance, human-factors also need to be carefully addressed, 
including cognitive ergonomics in human-machine interaction [9][82].  
Regardless the specific system to be implemented, the first objective is to model the 
overall integration process of heterogeneous information, in order to conceive a real-
time data comprehension framework. Within the context of analysis and reasoning 
about dynamic situations, where application domains include information-rich 
environments, an active field of research is focused on Information Fusion (IF). IF 
takes into account the specific aims related to the application domain, on the one hand, 
and the different characteristics of the available multimodal subsystems, on the other. 
In fact, IF may: provide information at different semantic levels and in different 
formats, require different kinds of processing, have different reliability levels, and 
have a certain degree of mutual correlation [6]. The complexity of such a task requires 
an appropriate strategy to fuse the available information. Using an efficient fusion 
scheme, one may expect significant advantages, such as: 
 Enlarging information extraction from the available sources; 
 Improving confidence in decisions by leveraging more information; 
 Increasing robustness against sensor failures and outliers in measurements 
(stability). 
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However, an important issue regarding IF is that, while using additional information is 
intuitively advantageous to add knowledge and to support decisions, the overall 
performance of the fusion process can decrease in case of additional incorrect data 
[23]. Other basic concepts characterizing IF systems and the models proposed in 
literature are described in the following.  
 
1.2.2 Information Fusion models  
Data need to be analyzed effectively and efficiently to provide appropriate information 
for intelligent decision making [78]. Hence, the power of Information Fusion is being 
increasingly considered in several applications. Empirical studies have shown the 
overall improvements of information systems based on fusion of different information 
sources [42]. In particular, fusion of relevant data has proven effective in reducing 
uncertainty (e.g. false alarm rates), in increasing accuracy (in terms of confidence 
levels) in the early detection of threats, and in increasing robustness by exploiting 
redundant information [14]; being able to deal with data that is redundant, inconsistent 
and conflicting [4] is also essential. The basic motivation of IF is described as follows:  
“exploiting the synergy in the information acquired from multiple sources (sensor, 
databases, information gathered by humans, etc.) such that the resulting decision or 
action is in some sense better […] than would be possible if any of these sources were 
used individually without synergy exploitation” [24].  
Although it is widely recognized that IF can support and enhance decision making, an 
Information Fusion System (IFS) is not concretely viewed as a Decision Support 
System (DSS) [60]. In this sense, many heterogeneous fields of research often exploit 
the results already available in other sectors like defense [81]. 
Several works have attempted to characterise IFS, but actually there is no general 
consensus in the literature regarding the components of an IFS; consequently, there are 
slightly different opinions on what is required for a system to be classified as an IFS. 
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Basically, we can say that an IFS needs to receive information from different 
information sources, including sensors and smart devices, human sources or data 
archives (depending on the context). The sources could be classified as either past 
(e.g. data archives), present (e.g. sensors) or future (e.g. simulations/models) [60]. 
An information fusion process of different sources can be automated with the purpose 
to achieve timely, robust, and relevant assessment of unfolding situations (e.g. in 
terms of threats, within the context of physical security) and their possible projections.   
 
 
Figure 4 – Schematic representation of the information fusion system 
Recently, it has been acknowledged that the user could actually contribute to the 
information fusion process [11][12][59]. Typically an IFS involves different degrees 
of automation and user involvement within two extremes: ‘user dominant’ (i.e. user is 
in control of the fusion process) and ‘machine dominant’ (i.e. fully automated fusion 
process).  
In the IF research community, different models have been proposed to have a common 
understanding across different applications domains which use the information fusion 
concepts. The most significant ones are presented in the following.  
 
The JDL model 
The following model was created by the U.S. Joint Directors of Laboratories, hence 
the name ‘JDL’. It is the most commonly used model which categorises the fusion 
process. In general, the model describes how IFS transforms sensor data into 
information which a user can employ for decision making [57].  
 
Past Sources
Present Sources
Future Sources
IF Process
Information Fusion System
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Figure 5 – JDL model  
The model is readable from left to right (see Figure 5), from the different sources of 
information to the user interface, i.e. the HCI (Human Computer Interface). Between 
them, the different levels may be viewed in a hierarchical order, although the JDL 
model is not a process model indicating a flow. Rather it shows different categories of 
functions. While the DBMS (DataBase Management System) supports the 
maintenance of the data used and provided by the IFS.  
Only for convenience, the functions are described in their hierarchical order. In 
particular, levels 0-3 represent the “assessment functions”, instead of levels 4 and 5 
which represent “refinement functions”. The latter could be considered as a sort of 
meta-processes, which control and refine the previous levels. More in detail, the 
different levels are described as follows [42]: 
 Level 0 pre-processing (signal assessment): this level pre-processes data at the 
individual sensor in order not to overwhelm the system with raw data; 
 Level 1 processing (object assessment): “fusion of multi-sensor data to 
determine the position, velocity, attributes, characteristics, and identity of an 
entity (such as an emitter or target)”; 
 Level 2 processing (situation assessment): “automated reasoning to refine our 
estimate of a situation (including determining the relationships among 
observed entities, relationships between entities and the environment, and 
general interpretation of the meaning of the observed entities)”;  
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 Level 3 processing (impact assessment): “projection of the current situation 
into the future or define alternative hypotheses regarding possible threats or 
future conditions”. This level is also sometimes referred to as threat 
refinement/assessment;  
 Level 4 processing (process refinements): “a meta process that monitors the 
ongoing data fusion process to improve the processing results (namely 
improved accuracy of estimated identity of entities and improved assessment 
of the current situation and hypothesized threats)”;  
 Level 5 processing (cognitive refinements): “interaction between the data 
fusion system and a human decision maker to improve the interpretation of 
results and the decision-making process”.  
First of all, raw data may be pre-processed (Level 0-signal assessment) in order to 
assess the signals from the sensors and extract key information (e.g. functions such as 
video, audio, or signal processing). Since the information sources could refer to 
sensors as well as agents (human sources) or data archives, this activity should be 
tailored on the typology of the sources, bringing the extracted information to the same 
semantic level before the subsequent processing.  
The second function is object assessment (Level 1) and it concerns the combination of 
data from different sources to obtain estimates of an object’s attributes or identity (e.g. 
classical techniques such as tracking and pattern recognition are used).  
Level 2, situation assessment, is a collection of functions to interpret the different 
objects’ relationships and their relationships with the environment (typically 
automated reasoning and artificial intelligence techniques are used here). The 
difference between the two levels is the following: Level 1 involves attribute-based 
state estimations, while Level 2 involves relation-based state estimations [44].  
Impact assessment (Level 3) concerns the future states and the projection of the 
interpreted situations, in order to assess the possible threats, risks and impacts.  
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In Figure 5, Level 4 and Level 5 are located on the border of the fusion process. They 
are quite similar, although there are some distinguishing features. The main difference 
between them lays in the responsibility of the refinement process: in Level 4, the 
responsible is the system itself, in Level 5 it is the user who controls the process 
depending on the particular needs he/she has at the moment. Anyway, the 
incorporation of Level 5 into the JDL model has not yet achieved common usage 
within the information fusion community [43]. However, the aspect related to the 
understanding of the active role of human information processing in IF should be 
carefully addressed [58]. The JDL model is under constant revision, and although 
other models have emerged, they have not gained the same popularity. One of the 
reasons for that is related to the holistic perspective provided by the model, which is 
usable for many purposes related to the research domain of IF systems [61].  
 
Dasarathy’s functional model  
Dasarathy defined a useful category of different fusion functions, based on the types 
of data and information processed and on the types of results obtained from the 
process [22]. The input and output of a fusion process can be of any level: Data, 
Feature, and Decision. For this reason the Dasarathy’s functional model is also known 
as DFD model (see Figure 6).  
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In this way it is easy to represent different fusion techniques. The components 
responsible for the fusion stages are the following:  
 DAI-DAO (Data In – Data Out) 
 DAI-FEO (Data In – Feature Out) 
 FEI-FEO (Feature In – Feature Out) 
 FEI-DEO (Feature In – Decision Out) 
 DEI-DEO (Decision In – Decision Out) 
where DAI-DAO corresponds to Low Level Fusion, FEI-FEO to Medium Level 
Fusion, DEI-DEO to High Level Fusion, and DAI-FEO and FEI-DEO are included in 
Multilevel Fusion. The main contribution of Dasarathy’s classification is that it 
specifies the abstraction level of both the input and the output of a fusion process, 
avoiding possible ambiguities. However, this functional model refers to a data driven 
process [44], where an overall systemic view is not provided and the user role cannot 
be accommodated. In [74] a mapping between Dasarathy’s functional model and JDL 
model has been provided.  
 
 
Figure 6 – DFD model 
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OODA loop model 
Another model for IF, mainly developed in the military field, is the OODA (Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act) loop. The aim of the model is to enable faster decisions by 
identifying both your own decisions and your opponent’s ones, in order to act before 
your opponent. Despite the fact that the OODA-loop is quite simplistic, it is the most 
accepted decision making process model used within information fusion. The four 
activities considered in the process are the following (see Figure 7): 
 Observe: the environment, in order to detect an opponent;  
 Orient: position yourself in the environment, in a good place for the next step;  
 Decide: make a decision, based on previous stages; 
 Act: perform the decision. 
 
 
Figure 7 – OODA loop 
The model illustrates the ultimate goal of a decision maker, taking the right decision 
within the minimum time, where speed is a condition for winning. Although the 
OODA loop has its origins in the military domain, it focuses more in general in the 
human decision process. Besides, the only military-specific term is “orient”, so by 
replacing this term with “interpret” (to represent the concept of situation 
understanding), the model becomes more generic.  
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Formally, an extension of the original OODA loop model in order to improve the 
capacity to represent dynamic and complex situations by a modular approach, is 
proposed with the M-OODA (modular OODA) loop [70]. It consists of four goal-
oriented modules (more generic than the original four activities):  
 Data gathering (Observe); 
 Situation understanding (Orient); 
 Action selection (Decide); 
 Action implementation (Act).  
In addition, each module is structured around three components: Process, State, and 
Control. The M-OODA loop incorporates explicit control elements within and across 
modules enabling a bidirectional data/information flow between modules. It also 
includes a feedback loop within each module. Finally, it provides a basic architecture 
for modeling a variety of team (rather than individual) decision-making, differently 
from the OODA loop. 
 
Object Oriented reference model 
The object oriented reference model represents a formal approach to fusion system 
design and it shows the role of the psychology of the human-computer interface in the 
system design process [49]. In fact, with this model the human capabilities can 
naturally find their space. In particular, the model does not specify fusion tasks or 
activities, however it provides a set of roles and specifies the relationships among 
them. The identified roles are: 
 Actor: responsible for the interaction with the world, collecting information 
and acting on the environment; 
 Perceiver: once information is gathered, the perceiver assesses such 
information providing a contextualized analysis to the director; 
 Director: based on the analysis provided by the perceiver, the director builds 
an action plan specifying the system’s goals; 
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 Manager: the manager controls the actors to execute the plans formulated by 
the director. 
The proposed model perspective is such that human and computer objects are not 
distinct. 
 
Waterfall Model 
The Waterfall model is an example of hierarchical architecture, described in [45]. The 
flow of data operates from the data level to the decision-making level, where the 
sensor system module (Level 1) is continuously updated with feedback from the 
decision-making module (Level 3). The intermediate level is responsible for the 
pattern processing. The three levels are described as follows: 
 Level 1 transforms raw data to provide the required information about the 
environment; 
 Level 2 is composed of feature extraction and fusion in order to obtain an 
inference about the data. The output of this level is a list of estimates with 
associated probabilities; 
 Level 3 relates objects to events, according to the information that has been 
gathered, the available libraries and databases, and the human interaction. 
A detailed schema of the model is proposed in [28]. 
 
Omnibus Process Model 
This model draws together several models, taking their advantages and overcoming 
some of their disadvantages, presenting a general taxonomy to capture the IF process 
[8]. The models involved are: JDL, OODA loop, DFD, and the waterfall model. 
Omnibus process model includes a dual perspective: system and task oriented. The 
decision making is considered as a computational process. It can be considered as 
Level 4 of the JDL model, and as the Decide phase of the OODA loop.   
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1.3 Event correlation techniques 
Whatever the monitoring solution (through a single sensor, a multimodal sensing, an 
integrated surveillance system, or a PSIM system) and the IF strategy, in the described 
context the objective is to capture events that occur in the monitored environment. At 
the same time, the event correlation is aimed at capturing all the further events of 
interest within the application domain, in such a way to undertake ad-hoc actions or 
procedures (sequences of actions) to manage the situations corresponding to these 
events. That is the main reason why, in such applications, is common to refer to an 
event-driven approach to design real-time detection systems. Many practical 
applications require to react to complex event patterns, rather than single event 
occurrences. To simplify design and analysis of such reactive systems, it is useful to 
separate the detection mechanism of complex event patterns from the rest of the 
application logic, e.g. in charge of a PSIM system.       
Complex Event Processing (CEP) is one of the main field of research dealing with the 
handling of events. It is also closely linked to the Event-Driven Architecture (EDA) 
paradigm, which concerns detection, consumption of, and reaction to events. CEP is 
on the top and it filters, matches, and aggregates events into higher-level events [69]. 
CEP is aimed at the processing of information streams (associated to the occurred 
events) to infer complex events patterns corresponding to more complicated situations. 
In the context we move, each event is associated to a meaningful change of state in the 
monitored environment. The information to combine in real-time comes from multiple 
sensing sources and the complex events represent threat scenarios, to which one 
should respond, quickly and accurately.    
The topic of correlation is widespread in many fields, like data networks (e.g. to detect 
faults or security-related attacks) and active databases (e.g. to enable the recognition 
of complex combinations of events). According to the application, specific complex 
event patterns should be matched against the streams of occurred events during the 
run-time of the system.         
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Regarding the physical security of infrastructures, we can define the event correlation 
task as an interpretation procedure to confer a new meaning (indicative of possible 
threats) to a set of simple events (detected by each sensing system) happened within a 
predefined time interval. The procedure could range from trivial event compression, 
filtering, counting to complex pattern matching. Correlation can also consider 
temporal relations between events, while the event clustering allows the creation of 
complex patterns e.g. by means of boolean operators. The single terms in the pattern 
could be primary or higher-level events (i.e. generated by the correlation process) [15].  
The main event correlation approaches for situation recognition are the following:  
 Rule-based  
It is based on “if-then” rules, which represent the specific knowledge, relevant 
for the application. A well-formed rule consists of a prerequisite (or a set of 
prerequisites), which must be satisfied to apply the rule, linked to an action to 
be performed if the rule is applied. A rule-based system has an inference 
engine (to define the order with which the applicable rules will be executed), a 
knowledge base (including the set of all the rules), and a working memory 
(containing the data about the current monitored situation). The rules matching 
can be exact or partial, if all the prerequisites should be satisfied or not, before 
executing the action. In several contexts, such rules are often named Event 
Condition Action (ECA) rules. From a certain point of view, majority voting 
methods also belong to rule-based category, since they achieve a final 
“opinion” on a specific topic, according to a majority rule (absolute or relative) 
applied on a set of opinions, i.e. votes [6] [65]. Typically, rule-based systems 
have a stateful and offline execution mode. In the existing literature, the 
approach has been successfully used, for example, in face detection, human 
tracking and person identification. However, from the viewpoint of this thesis, 
we assume that each sensing system (e.g. VMS, ACS, and so on) takes already 
in charge all these tasks at a lower abstraction level.           
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 State transition based  
The typical use of this approach is aimed at recognition of patterns in 
sequences of symbolic input. Finite State Machine (FSM) and Petri Net belong 
to this category. FSM is characterized by a finite set of states, a pre-defined 
starting state, an alphabet of possible input and output events, and a state 
transition function which determines the next state and the possible output 
(optional) for each state and input event [71]. An application example, where 
complex event detection is implemented using automata, is the Ode approach 
for active databases [39]. In this case, management and manipulation of the 
database is performed by means of an object oriented language.       
A Petri net is useful to represent causal dependencies and concurrent processes 
[71]. It is a directed bipartite graph, in which the nodes represent transitions 
(symbolized by bars), i.e. events that may occur, and places (symbolized by 
circles), i.e. conditions. The directed arcs (symbolized by arrows) run from a 
place to a transition or vice versa (never between places or between 
transitions). A Petri net may contain a certain number of tokens. Only with a 
sufficient number of tokens at the start of all input arcs, each transition is 
enabled. Once executed, it places these tokens at the end of all output arcs. On 
this formalism is based the composite event detection of Samos approach for 
an Object Oriented Data-Base Management System (OODBMS) [38]. In this 
case, each primitive event is represented by a Petri net place. The event 
occurrences are entered as individual tokens. Further net places and transitions 
represent complex event expressions. A different approach is based on the 
semantics of the Snoop event algebra, including a set of operators [17]. Its 
concepts have been implemented in a prototype called Sentinel [18] for an 
active object-oriented database. Composite event detection is graph-based: 
simple event occurrences enter the bottom nodes and flow upwards through the 
graph, being joined into composite event occurrences. Besides, ad-hoc 
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consumption modes of simple event occurrences augment the semantics of 
composite events. In [5] the implementation of an event detection engine for 
the Web, that detects composite events specified by expressions of an 
illustrative sublanguage of the Snoop event algebra, is presented.      
 Classification-based  
The approach is used to obtain a decision, classifying an observation into one 
of the pre-defined classes. Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a popular 
method for classification tasks, also in the domain of multimedia surveillance. 
It is a binary classifier exploiting a supervised learning method. In order to 
detect high level semantic concepts, the input of a SVM could be a vector 
including all the low level features, e.g. related to video, audio, and so on [2]. 
A further classification-based approach is the Bayesian network (BN, also 
named belief network). It is a directed acyclic graph which models 
probabilistic relations, e.g. between the threats and the primitive events 
detected by sensors. Given the event occurrences, a BN can compute the 
probabilities of the threats. The approach is widely used in multimedia analysis 
[6][7]. However, it requires well defined a-priory and conditional probabilities 
of the hypothesis (e.g. about the threats and related triggering events) to be 
effective. Finally, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is another approach 
adopted for event correlation. The idea is to reproduce with an artificial model 
the functioning of the human brain. ANN is made up by nodes, which perform 
operations on weighted inputs to get an output, possibly used as input for 
further nodes [51]. The processing can be of several typologies (mathematical, 
temporal, etc.). Ad hoc procedures can be used for adapting the weight 
dynamically. ANN is a non-linear black box that can be trained to solve 
complex and high dimensional problems, however the selection of a proper 
network architecture (for the specific application) can be difficult and the 
training can be time-consuming [6].      
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The logic and temporal aspects of event correlation are the main concerns addressed in 
Chapter 3, where a graph-based event detection is described.   
     
1.4 Open issues 
In all the activities concerning the described context, Information Technology (IT) 
plays an important role, since it enables new and effective means to mitigate risks, 
providing early warning of threats and improving the response to disasters of various 
severity. As such, IT has an impact also in increasing CIs resilience. In fact, sensor-
based technologies for detecting meaningful events can help in preventing unwilled 
situations. Traditionally, at least (digital) video-surveillance and intrusion detection 
technologies have been employed. However, for an enhanced early warning and 
situation awareness, the traditional technologies are not enough.  
Often, the management of the security-related events is fragmented. Each event is 
treated separately. And many times there is a lack of an effective information sharing. 
The key to overcome those limitations is to synthesize data from multiple alerting 
systems and physical sensors. The use of distributed and heterogeneous sensorial 
subsystems (encouraged by the development of novel low-cost sensing devices) and 
their integration, can lead to several levels of event correlation. A low level integration 
allows for the development of multi-modal approaches for monitoring and 
surveillance activities. Such a solution aims at providing advanced event detection 
capabilities and/or at improving detection reliability. Some of these benefits are 
counteracted by additional problems, like harder calibration and correct management 
of available cameras, for example in multi-camera systems. In many installations, 
multiple sensing systems are integrated at junction-box level. The result is a more 
immediate and reliable data correlation, however the integration may be more difficult 
for the different representations (and semantic levels) of the combined modalities (e.g. 
audio and video), and the scalability of the solution can be limited with respect to the 
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needs. In fact, many infrastructures (especially transportation systems) can be spread 
through hundreds of kilometres. In addition to that, they can require thousands of 
cameras and other sensors, which makes human-based surveillance unfeasible. Manual 
analysis of video as well as diverse sensor alarms (which can be false) is labour 
intensive, fatiguing, and prone to errors. Additionally, psychophysical research 
indicates that there are severe limitations in the ability of humans to monitor 
simultaneous signals. Thus, it is clear that there is a fundamental contradiction 
between the current surveillance model and human surveillance capabilities. 
Therefore, software-aided real-time video analytics considerably alleviates the human 
constraints, which currently are the main handicap for analyzing continuous 
surveillance data [16]. However, though video-analytics may not be considered as a 
novel development (in fact, Computer Vision research has been active since early 
80s), recent experiences using state-of-the-art systems reported low performance in 
terms of false alarms and missed detections. Therefore, the redundancy and diversity 
of sensing technology is essential to build effective surveillance systems. That 
increases the number of sensing devices and - consequently - of the alarms to be 
integrated and managed. 
High level information aggregation is the key to develop the next generation of 
security management systems, the so called PSIM (Physical Security Information 
Management) systems. They help in integrating security devices, in improving 
detection efficiency and effectiveness, and in enhancing the overall situation 
awareness and management. One of the key factors to achieve those results is the 
presentation of all the relevant information into a single view, in order to provide 
essential decision support features.  
In this thesis we have considered IF strategies and event correlation capabilities as the 
main resources to address these issues. Regarding IF, the main open issue is to create a 
convergence with the Decision Support (DS) research field. IF and DS areas has been 
developed independently from each other. However, there is the real need to provide 
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the user's perspective in the IFS design, and to exploit IF in the DSS design as a 
technique to support and improve decision-making [60]. At the same time, event 
correlation capabilities should help in providing data analysis and interpretation in 
real-time, which represents an added value of the PSIM systems with respect to the 
traditional security management systems (like VMS, ACS, etc.). Of course, the lack of 
advanced applications in PSIM is motivated by the still missing light, efficient, and 
easy-to-use correlation approaches.   
 
 
Figure 8 – PSIM life cycle analysis 
Nowadays the effective exploitation of all these potentialities represents a way to 
overcome the main obstacles to the PSIM deployment in the years to come. They are 
mainly due to the lack of understanding of what PSIM is/does, the high costs, and the 
partial overlap with other tradition systems (like the VMS) [46]. It is worth noting that 
doubts and limitations regarding PSIM are also the consequence of the early stages of  
its development (see Figure 8), which will demonstrate its full potential in the medium 
to long term [36]. 
In the context described above, the novel research must aim at detecting threats 
scenarios as early as possible, providing superior situation awareness and decision 
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support to quickly – possibly automatically – activate response-and-recovery 
strategies. That can be achieved by means of ad-hoc information fusion and event 
correlation techniques. All those aspects contribute to what we define “augmented 
surveillance”: an integrated concept, including technologies, capabilities and 
functions, which we believe will be one of the most challenging paradigm of the CIP 
(and not only) research in the future. Chapter 2 presents a more detailed description of 
such a paradigm, while Chapter 3 describes an advanced framework for event 
correlation in PSIM. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 introduce the further developments of 
the framework aimed at improving detection effectiveness and efficiency. Real 
applications in a more specific domain and the overall integration with an existing 
PSIM system are finally included in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.        
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Chapter 2  
Towards an augmented surveillance paradigm   
 
2.1 Basic concepts and requirements 
This section describes a paradigm aimed at the physical protection of assets in threat 
scenarios. The basic idea is to collect and exploit all the means, techniques, methods, 
and approaches already available (and briefly described in the previous sections), in 
order to obtain an integrated layered platform easy to adapt to the specific application 
domain.  
The key to achieve “augmented surveillance” is to combine and synthesize data from 
multiple and distributed sensorial subsystems, at different levels. First of all, 
technological issues, techniques and methodologies of protection, and overall fusion 
strategies should be viewed in a cohesive way. Furthermore, ad-hoc information 
integration and management should allow PSIM systems for reporting the available 
(or inferred) information into a single integrated view, to increase effectiveness and 
efficiency in decision support. The new PSIM generation can significantly contribute 
to improvements not only in threat detection, but in several directions, such as: 
 deterrence: to discourage the adversary from acting;  
 minimization: to mitigate the effects of attacks;  
 response: to enable operators to counteract the attack and to protect assets and 
persons;  
 recovery: to enable the system to resume normal operations.  
The proposed paradigm is aimed at reaching advanced early warning capabilities, 
inside a general context of enhanced Situation Awareness (SA). It aims at aiding 
decision makers in obtaining a greater knowledge of events, factors, and variables 
affecting a certain environment. According to one of the first and most widely 
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accepted definitions, SA is the perception of elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 
their status in the near future [26].  
SA includes also the important concept of “situation recognition”, which aims at 
identifying a-priori defined situation patterns within an information flow, in order to 
support decision makers allowing them to focus only on the most relevant aspects. 
Situation recognition can be considered as a pattern matching problem, where patterns 
represent situations of interest. In such a task, often the issue is not the lack of 
information, but finding the information needed when needed [27]. That requires the 
use of computer-based support systems, since the human operators may not be able to 
analyze all information properly and timely. Further background concepts specifically 
related to multimedia surveillance and monitoring systems are provided in [7]. 
From the physical security viewpoint, the a-priori defined situations of interest include 
the threat scenarios, which are identified during the phase of Risk Analysis (RA), 
performed for the infrastructure or the assets to be protected. They are typically 
composed by sequences of actions used by attackers to reach their objective. The 
preliminary stage of RA regards the adoption of rigorous and systematic approaches to 
model possibly complex threats. The aim is to identify and to model, using a certain 
formalism, the possible modes of attack (i.e. the threat scenarios). Each threat is 
typically associated to a risk index to obtain a quantitative or qualitative classification. 
This is essential to define a priority in the adoption of countermeasures and protection 
mechanisms. Therefore, for all the subsequent stages (selection of detectors, system 
deployment, definition of the IF strategy, etc.) an a-priori knowledge about the 
possible threat scenarios can be assumed. 
The increasing need for correlating large heterogeneous information to provide greater 
SA and early warning should fulfil several requirements. First of all, given a known 
threat and assuming that: 
 all the means (i.e. sensors and devices) for threat detection are available; 
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 each device works properly, i.e. it is in the condition to correctly detect a 
threats trace (data, status, event, etc.); 
the detection of the threat and the report of related alarm to the operators should be 
assured. In other words, given a problem, the existence of a “solution” should be 
assured. This affects the overall approach (e.g. correlation techniques and related 
models) which lies behind the detection mechanism implemented by the surveillance 
systems.  
In addition to that, a quick data processing is required. Therefore the logic which rules 
the behavior of the surveillance system should be based on models sharing the 
requirement of (soft) real-time solvability. 
The requirements above mentioned should be fulfilled also with a certain level of 
reliability. In fact, the surveillance systems should assure as much as possible a high 
POD (Probability Of Detection) and a low FAR (False Alarm Rate): those parameters 
determine the effectiveness and the viability of the system, respectively (see section 
2.2).  
These considerations give useful indications in defining the right approach to face the 
detection problem. For example, an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) represents a 
possible approach to solve large and computationally demanding problems. It is 
usually used to model complex relationships between inputs and outputs or to find 
patterns in data. However, ANN is also a non-linear black-box, which require a 
training phase. Therefore, it is necessary to reason on more specific constraints:  
a. to assure the predictability and repeatability of the behaviour of the system 
(e.g. within an ANN, it is not possible to describe the stored Knowledge 
Base, KB); 
b. to overcome the critical concern of the learning phase, that can require 
sophisticated training techniques, long computation time, and a large set of 
examples; 
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c. to fulfil the requirement related to the existence of a “solution” (e.g. ANN 
cannot assure a solution to the posed problem, since the existence of a 
learning algorithm which converges is not guaranteed).  
The above statements suggest using expert systems, which are not "intelligent" in the 
usual sense of the word, i.e. in a creative way. While the deductions of expert systems 
are constrained by the stored KB, they can process a large amount of data very 
quickly, taking into account many “rules” and details that human experts cannot do. 
One limit of this approach is that the completeness of the KB depends on the 
effectiveness and quality of the RA activity: threat scenarios that are not identified and 
translated into a model will never be detected.  
This issue leads to a further reasoning on the capabilities to be provided by modern 
PSIM systems featuring a certain level of ‘augmented surveillance’. The model-based 
threat detection approach, in fact, should also assure a certain tolerance to imperfect 
modeling (due to human faults) on the one hand, and to missed detections (due to 
device faults) on the other. The set of possible solutions includes techniques of pattern 
matching and similarity analysis, in order to recognize new and not (perfectly) 
modeled threats. The techniques based on similarity between patterns are not new, in 
particular in the field of computer network intrusion detection systems. They are often 
based on the following solution: if an alert, which is the known consequence of a 
forerunning event, is received and the forerunning event has not been detected, then 
the missed event can be identified [21]. The limit of this solution lies in the fact that it 
cannot cope with missing events that are not linked to other events. A more effective 
technique should not assume that direct cause/consequence relationships exist between 
detected and missing events. For example, this is possible with solutions based on ad-
hoc metrics. With respect to traditional approaches of infrastructure surveillance, such 
a technique allows for earlier as well as more robust and straightforward detection of 
complex threat scenarios. It does not require further modeling efforts, since threat 
scenarios do not need to evolve completely to provide a warning: operators may 
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receive a warning level which is somehow proportional to the similarity index. These 
quantitative indications about unfolding threats can effectively help operators to 
quickly undertake appropriate countermeasures [32].  
Innovative approaches for the design of distributed surveillance systems should aim at 
adding interactivity and adaptability capabilities, fulfilling the constraint of a 
preventive and manageable mode of reaction. Recent studies on Cognitive Systems 
(CS) help in reaching this goal. As matter of fact, automatic surveillance systems are 
required to emulate the cognitive capabilities of human operators in detecting and 
assessing possible threats. In particular, this kind of approach is increasingly used in 
the field of  intelligent video surveillance [54], not only to understand complex 
activities occurring within a video stream, but also to learn from them in such a way to 
build a knowledge base automatically adapted to the specific environment. Recently, 
the cognitive paradigm has been also applied to the field of CIP [19], in order to 
provide a more comprehensive situation awareness. Methods for the representation 
and the organization of knowledge and for the learning from experience allow a 
system to evaluate the state evolution and to predict near future events. The emerging 
concept of cognitive surveillance, based on this kind of researches, aims at providing  
these capabilities also by means of the cooperation with human agents to perform 
corrective actions. Regarding the cognitive cycle, discussions about the correctness 
and suitability of the semantic descriptions of events of interest (depending on the 
domain) are provided in [29].  
 
2.2 Viability and effectiveness 
The human management of critical situations involving many simultaneous events is a 
very delicate task, which can be error prone. Integrated surveillance systems are 
necessary to allow the human supervision of a large number of sensors, devices, or 
cameras positioned inside the environment to be monitored. These systems allow to 
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call the attention of the operators only and anytime an alarm is detected, trying to 
make surveillance independent from their attention level. Generally speaking, the 
concern is related to a quick and effective management of possible large amounts of 
data (e.g. events, alarms, etc.). Therefore the first challenging goal is to support and 
strengthen the human capabilities without replacing them. The main motivation relies 
in the need for taking into account many details that a human could ignore, miss or 
forget. 
Since a few human operators are usually employed in security surveillance, human-
factors need to be carefully addressed, including cognitive ergonomics in human-
machine interaction. In fact, many critical tasks are under the responsibility of human 
operators, that cannot manage a great amount of surveillance streams in real time. 
Hence, it is necessary to find the best trade-off between the tendency of sensing 
subsystems to produce a large amount of data (events, warnings, alerts) and the 
limited human capabilities. In the field of Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE), it is 
widely believed that highly non-stimulating and repetitive activities make human 
surveillance very difficult [73]. This is especially true in multimedia surveillance 
systems, where the operators may monitor a wide area, through a large number of 
sensors producing many events, warnings and alerts. 
Furthermore, modern surveillance systems typically support the undertaking of 
countermeasures, whose activation can be fully automatic (independent from human 
intervention) or partially automatic (based on human discrimination, e.g. by manual 
confirmation of detected alarms). The choice of the response mode may depend on the 
kind of countermeasure, but also on timeliness requirements and on the alarm 
trustworthiness.   
Obviously, alarm systems should only detect situations that actually represent a threat. 
However, intelligent sensing systems may generate unnecessary warnings, which can 
be classified as false alarms or nuisance alarms. Therefore, with regard to the 
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triggering of countermeasures, it is very important to take into account and to control 
the rate of these alarms.  
False alarms are due to events that should not cause an alarm, while nuisance alarms 
are generated when a legitimate cause occurs, but the related alarm activation is 
inconvenient. As an example, nuisance alarms occur when maintenance staff enters 
restricted areas without prior identification. False and nuisance alarms can have a 
significant impact on: 
 operational efficiency, due to the time wasted in evaluating and dismissing 
unnecessary alarms as well as in the possible de-activation of automatic 
countermeasures;  
 vigilance level and response time, since when a large number of alarms are 
false, operators tend not to trust them. 
In other words, if the probability of detection determines system effectiveness, false 
and nuisance alarm rates significantly influence its operational viability and efficiency. 
Therefore, it is essential to identify reasonable goals for detection and false alarm 
rates, and then to determine the methods to achieve them.  
Considering the joint automation-human performance and in particular how the level 
of automation unreliability affects human performance – a research revealed that 
alarm systems should have a reliability factor of 70% [82]. At a reliability level below 
this threshold, the automation can be considered worse than no automation at all, 
nullifying its practical usefulness. The analysis also showed that performance was 
more strongly affected by reliability in high workload conditions, which are critical in 
the context of surveillance and supervision.  
According to this result, when more than 30% of alarms are false or nuisance, 
operators: waste time in discarding alarms; ignore or respond slowly to real events; 
lose confidence in the surveillance system. This aspect is tied to the adverse effects of 
false alarms on human behavior. The rule mentioned above is important to establish a 
minimum level of reliability in order to achieve a viable system.  
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Many approaches address the issue of nuisance alarms in a retroactive way, in 
particular employing self-learning engines to filter out unnecessary alarms based on 
human feedback. With this capability, the system can adapt to the specific conditions 
of each installation and learn to recognize events which are cause of false and 
nuisance alarms. The difficulties of this approach lie in the self-learning process, 
recognition strategy and duration. 
One obvious method to improve detection rates is to increase the sensitivity of the 
sensing subsystems; however, this will also increase the number of false alarms. 
Following the usability criterion mentioned above, the surveillance system (and/or its 
HMIs) should be optimized in such a way to get the highest detection rate with no 
more than 30 discardable alarms out of any 100 generated (on average). An 
improvement of alarm trustworthiness as well as system resilience can be achieved by 
exploiting redundancy and diversity in sensors displacement and technologies. 
 
2.3 Practical applications 
In this section, a practical application of augmented surveillance is proposed. One of 
the basic needs is to frame in a cohesive way technologies, techniques, capabilities, 
and features available for distributed intelligent monitoring in order to merge the two 
areas of Information Fusion (IF) and Decision Support (DS). More in detail, in the 
field of IF there is a lack of the research focusing on the user’s decision making 
process embedded in an information fusion system, that is essential to fully take 
advantage of its benefits [60]. In order to represent the overall process describing how 
information transforms from sensor data to information which a user can use for 
decision making, a general model is proposed. It is based on the JDL model (see 
section 1.2.2), because it highlights three important aspects that are reflected in the 
domains of interest:  
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a. The possible need for pre-processing raw data coming from sensors. This 
aspect depends on the level of heterogeneity of the sensing subsystems 
(ranging from temperature sensors to intelligent cameras) and on the semantic 
level of the information provided by them. The issue could be addressed by the 
subsystems, by the PSIM which integrates them (by means of an “Adaption 
and Connectivity” layer, as shown in Figure 3), or even before information 
fusion processing.  
b. The identification of different levels of capabilities. The data combination from 
sources is aimed at evaluating: i) states, attributes or identities of the monitored 
entities; ii) mutual relationships between monitored entities and surrounding 
environment; iii) future states and projections starting from recognized 
situations, in order to assess threats, risks and possible impacts.  
c. The need for performing a constant refinement process, which can be 
automatic, user-driven or hybrid. In fact, the user can effectively contribute to 
this process to complement the information fusion system [10]. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Overall data/information management process 
An overall process for handling data from multiple sources is represented in Figure 9. 
In the figure, each source may represent a single sensor (regardless of its 
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‘intelligence’), a complex – possibly multimodal – sensing subsystem, or a human 
agent. Depending on the type of outputs, a preliminary processing may be required or 
not. The figure remarks the important aspect of considering the IF and DS processes 
as a whole. Furthermore, it takes into account both the knowledge base (represented 
by detection models) and the relevant information data-bases (e.g. the ones used to 
store the user feedbacks) as information sources, which can be updated during the 
fusion process. Finally, the interaction with the final user allows for understanding 
situations, recognize emerging trends, undertake decisions and countermeasures.    
From the application point of view, the augmented surveillance paradigm could be 
implemented by an integrated framework addressing surveillance-related information 
at different levels; its PSIM capabilities should include:  
 the integration and interfacing with several heterogeneous sensing platforms, 
in such a way to solve the problem of the preliminary data processing;  
 the detection of relevant events occurring in all the monitored locations;  
 the warning and alarm reporting to operators in control centers, in order to 
support the emergency procedures and/or to activate automatic reactions.  
Since the PSIM may generate a large amount of alarms which could overwhelm the 
personnel in charge of reacting to suspicious events, event correlation capabilities 
need to be integrated into the framework in order to lower the false alarm rate and to 
improve threat detection reliability. The problem of event correlation has been largely 
studied in the scientific literature, and a wide class of potential solutions have been 
defined. Nevertheless, those results have been widely studied and applied to domains 
not related to physical security, e.g. to develop intrusion detection in computer 
networks. In physical security applications, the capabilities of legacy systems are very 
limited in data analysis and interpretation, and hence in real-time prevention and 
reaction. The lack of advanced approaches in PSIM may be motivated by the still 
missing light and efficient approaches to the recognition of evolving situations based 
on a-priori knowledge of threat patterns, to be easily updated by the human operators: 
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such an objective is far from being trivial to achieve. However, it is increasingly 
important to achieve early warning and situation awareness in domains where a large 
number of dynamic objects are engaged in complex spatial-temporal relations.  
In the assumptions that threat scenarios can be decomposed in a set of basic steps 
executed in a predictable sequence, model-based logical, spatial and temporal 
correlation of detector outputs can be used to recognize event patterns indicating 
possible threats. Ideally, in order to recognize (partially) unknown threats, the 
detection engine should be resilient to human faults in scenario modeling and sensor 
faults in detecting events. One possibility which has been recently researched is to 
consider heuristics like similarity analysis with known event patterns (see e.g. 
references [13] and [32]). 
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Chapter 3  
The DETECT framework  
 
3.1 General description  
The best way to face threats is to stop them before they can cause serious 
consequences. Unfortunately, visual surveillance of video streams and sensor alarms 
provided by traditional physical security systems does not allow human operators for a 
satisfactory situational awareness when the sequence of events is large, heterogeneous, 
geographically distributed and rapidly evolving. Therefore, human operators may not 
be able to recognize sequences of events which are indicative of possible threats due 
to their limited alert threshold and knowledge base. Furthermore, operators can be 
unable to guide and coordinate alarm responses or emergency interventions (in 
particular in case of simultaneous critical events) if they are not precisely aware of 
what is happening or has happened. In order to cope with these issues, early warning 
and decision support systems should be adopted to face physical security threats,  by 
means of heterogeneous distributed sensing subsystems.  
The heterogeneity of technologies and data requires integration and analysis at 
different levels. Assuming to solve the integration issue with a PSIM system (which 
is, for example, interfaced with each sensing subsystem through proper SDKs and 
APIs), there is the need for an on-line reasoning about the events captured by sensors, 
in order to early detect and properly manage security threats. The possible availability 
of heterogeneous and redundant information allows for the correlation of basic events 
in order to increase the overall probability of detection (POD), decrease the false 
alarm rate (FAR), warn the human operators about suspicious situations, and even 
enable the automatic trigger of adequate countermeasures.  
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This section describes the motivation, the working principles and the architecture of 
DETECT (DEcision Triggering Event Composer & Tracker) [35], a framework aimed 
at the automatic detection of physical security threats, possibly before they evolve to 
disastrous consequences. In fact, non trivial threat scenarios are made up by a set of 
basic steps which have to be executed in a predictable sequence and with possible 
variants. Such scenarios must be precisely identified during the important phase of 
Risk Analysis, to be performed on the infrastructures that one intends to protect [52]. 
DETECT operates by performing a model-based logical, spatial and temporal 
correlation of basic events detected by each monitoring subsystem, in order to “sniff” 
sequence of events which indicate – as early as possible – the likelihood of threats. In 
order to achieve this aim, DETECT is based on a detection engine which is able to 
reason about heterogeneous data, implementing the concept of “fusion” trough event 
correlation. The framework can be interfaced with existing PSIM systems, in order to 
effectively enhance the situation awareness and improve the decision making process 
of human operators. It can serve as an early warning tool, since it can alert the 
operators about the likelihood and nature of the threat, and consequently even to 
support the (automatic or manual) activation of adequate countermeasures for 
emergency/crisis management. As such, it may allow for a quicker and more focused 
response to threat scenarios, possibly before they can evolve. This feature represents a 
crucial point in the context of the human management of critical situations (in 
particular if it involves many simultaneous events). In fact it is a very delicate task, but 
also error prone as well as subject to forced inhibition. In addition to that, the 
correlation among basic events detected by diverse redundant sensors allows to lower 
the false alarm rate of the security system, thus improving the overall reliability of the 
security system. 
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Figure 10 – CIP life-cycle 
Finally, with particular reference to CIP application domain, DETECT is mainly 
located at the third stage (i.e. “Indications and warning”) of the CIP life-cycle reported 
in Figure 10. However, thanks to the overall integration with a PSIM system and to 
the developments described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the framework can involve 
also the other pre-event and post-event stages.  
 
3.2 Event description language 
Threats scenarios are described in DETECT using a specific Event Description 
Language (EDL) and stored in a Scenario Repository. In this way it is possible to store 
permanently all scenario features in an interoperable format (i.e. XML
3
). At the same 
time, the Event History database contains the list of basic events detected by the 
sensing devices. A high level architecture of the framework is depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11 – The DETECT framework 
The Detection Engine needs to recognize combination of events, bound each other 
with appropriate operators in order to form composite events of any complexity. The 
EDL of DETECT is derived from the Snoop event algebra [17], so let us define some 
basic concepts accordingly.  
                                                 
3
 XML (eXtended Markup Language) Metadata Interchange. 
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A threat scenario consists of a set of basic events (detected by the sensing devices), 
which occur in a predictable sequence with possible variants.  
An event is a happening that occurs at some location and at some point in time. In this 
context, events are related to sensor data (e.g. motion detected by a camera, intrusion 
detected by a volumetric sensor, etc.).  
Events are classified as primitive events and composite events. A primitive event is a 
condition on a specific sensor which is associated some parameters (i.e. event 
identifier, time of occurrence, etc). Primitive events represent the basic events 
mentioned previously. All the occurrences of primitive events are stored in the Event 
History database, whose schema includes at least the information indicated in Table 1.   
 
Field Name Field Description  Field format (example) 
IDev  Event Identifier Ex (e.g. E8) 
IDs Sensor Identifier  Sx (e.g. S4) 
Tp Timestamp yyyy-mm-dd hh:mm:ss  
(e.g. 2010-10-01 23:56:09) 
Table 1 – Parameters associated to a primitive event occurrence 
Since there is the need for specifying complex patterns of events, it is important to 
define an appropriate set of Operators. They allow to express relationships between 
primitive events and thus to combine them in a meaningful way. Therefore, a 
composite event is a combination of primitive events by means of proper operators 
(logical, temporal, etc.).  Formally an event E (either primitive or composite) is a 
function from the time domain onto the boolean values, True and False [18]: 
E: T  → {True, False}, given by: 
 
        True, if E occurs at time t 
   False, otherwise 
 
 
E (t) =  
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The basic assumption of considering a boolean function is quite general, since 
different events can be associated to a continuous sensor output, according to a set of 
specified thresholds. Furthermore, negate conditions (!E) can be used when there is 
the need for checking that an event is no longer occurring. This allows considering 
both instantaneous (“occurs” = “has occurred”) and continuous (“occurs” = “is 
occurring”) events. However, in order to simplify EDL syntax, negate conditions on 
events can be substituted by complementary events. An event Ec is complementary to 
E when: Ec  !E . 
Each event is denoted by an event expression, whose complexity grows with the 
number of involved events. Given the expressions E1, E2, …, En, every application on 
them through any operator is still an expression. Each event expression is represented 
by an event tree, where primitive events are at the leaves, while internal nodes 
represent the operators [33].  
The EDL considers the following operators: OR, AND, ANY, SEQ. As an example, 
Figure 12 shows an Event Tree for representing an event expression. Leaf nodes E1, 
E2 and E3 represent primitive events and internal nodes represent the “AND” and 
“OR” composite events. The whole event tree represents the composite event “(E1 
AND E2) OR E3”.  
 
 
Figure 12 – An example of event tree 
In summary, threat scenarios are identified during the phase of Risk Analysis, 
performed for the infrastructure to be protected, while the primitive events are the 
 
E1 E2 
E3 AND 
OR 
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ones detectable by the sensing devices installed on the field. The latter are related to 
sensor data variables (i.e. variable x greater than a fixed threshold, variable y in a fixed 
range, etc.). Using operators, it is possible to compose more complex events, which 
represent the threat scenarios indentified during the risk analysis. 
The semantics of the Snoop operators is as follows: 
 OR: disjunction of two events E1 and E2, denoted with (E1 OR E2). It occurs 
when at least one of its components occurs. 
 AND: conjunction of two events E1 and E2, denoted with (E1 AND E2). It 
occurs when both events occur (the temporal sequence is ignored).  
 ANY: a composite event, denoted with ANY(m, E1, E2,…, En), where nm  . It 
occurs when m out of n distinct events specified in the expression occur (the 
temporal sequence is ignored).  
 SEQ: sequence of two events E1 and E2, denoted with (E1 SEQ E2). It occurs 
when E2 occurs provided that E1 has already occurred. This means that the 
time of occurrence of E1 has to be less than the time of occurrence of E2. 
The sequence operator is used to define composite events when the order of its 
component events is relevant. Another way to take into account the time in the event 
correlation is by exploiting explicit temporal constraints. They can be specified on 
operators, to restrict the time validity of logic correlations. In fact, the latter could lose 
meaningfulness when the time interval between component events exceeds a certain 
threshold. Therefore, the definition of temporal constraints has the aim of setting a 
validity interval for the composite event. Such constraints (e.g. expressed in seconds) 
can be added to any logical operator in the formal expression used for event 
description. For instance, let us assume that in the composite event E = (E1 AND E2) 
the time interval between the occurrence of primitive events E1 and E2 must be at most 
T. The formal expression of the event E is modified by adding the temporal constraint 
[T] as follows: 
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( E1 AND E2 ) [T] = True 
  
 t1< t | ( E1(t)  E2(t1)  E1(t1)  E2(t) )  |t – t1| ≤ T 
A further issue to address involves the management of multiple occurrences of the 
same primitive event, during the detection of the composite event to which they 
belong. According to predetermined policies, it is possible to state which occurrences 
need to be considered during the composite event detection. Such policies, named 
parameter contexts, are used to set a specific consumption mode of these occurrences 
(collected in the Event History database). Four parameter contexts are defined in the 
Snoop event algebra. Given the concepts of initiator (the first constituent event whose 
occurrence starts the composite event detection) and terminator (the constituent event 
that is responsible for terminating the composite event detection), the four different 
contexts are described as follows:   
 Recent: only the most recent occurrence of the initiator is considered;   
 Chronicle: the (initiator, terminator) pair is unique. The oldest initiator is 
paired with the oldest terminator;  
 Continuous: each initiator starts the detection of the event;  
 Cumulative: all occurrences of primitive events are accumulated until the 
composite event is detected.  
Therefore, the selection of specific parameter context states which component event 
occurrences play an active part in the detection process. Thus, the effect of the 
operators is conditioned by the context. The use of parameter contexts augments the 
semantics of the composite events and makes the detection mechanism very flexible 
with respect to different classes of applications (see section 3.3).   
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Figure 13 – Building of a composite event through graphical interface    
DETECT is able to support the composition of complex events in the described EDL, 
through a Scenario GUI (Graphical User Interface). It is used to draw the event trees 
corresponding to threat scenarios, by means of an user-friendly interface (see Figure 
13). Furthermore, the interface allows to specify:  
 for each leaf node, the attributes “Event Identifier” and “Sensor Identifier”;  
 for each operator node, the attributes “Temporal Constraint” (optional), 
“Alarm Level” (optional, see section 3.3 for further details), and “Any 
Parameter” (i.e. the m parameter required for the ANY composite event only).  
The GUI is enabled to set further attributes, whose use is described in Chapter 5.         
 
3.3 Composite event detection 
The information sources in modern surveillance systems, in particular in extended 
infrastructures, may produce a very large number of events (warnings, alarms, 
diagnostic signals, and so on). In situation management task, this aspect can have a 
negative impact on: 
 the capability to follow a stream of incoming events; 
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 the correct interpretation of events;  
 the correct evaluation of seriousness and priority of events. 
Composite event detection is crucial to recognize complex event patterns within the 
information flow. The formalism to represent composite event detection is graph-
based, according to the Snoop event algebra [17][18]. In the described 
implementation, each graph is reduced to a tree, i.e. a directed acyclic graph with one 
root node. Therefore, the detection algorithm is able to reason on such data structure. 
Leaf nodes of the event tree represent primitive events. Internal nodes represent the 
composite events associated to the operators described in section 3.2. Each operator 
node can be considered as the root node of a corresponding sub-tree. 
The event occurrence (both primitive and composite) flows bottom-up from the node 
to their parents. More in detail, primitive event occurrences enter the bottom nodes 
and flow upwards through the tree, being joined into composite event occurrences. In 
other words, for each primitive event occurrence, if its “Event Identifier” and “Sensor 
Identifier” are the same of the ones specified in the leaf node of the tree, the 
occurrence is propagated upwards. Going on with this approach, when the composite 
event – representing an internal operator node – occurs, it is propagated upward to the 
its parents, and so on. Therefore, the overall composite event (defined by the user) 
occurs when the process reaches the composite event associated to the root node of the 
tree.  
As described in the previous sections, if a composite event has a temporal constraint, 
then it is propagated upwards only if the time interval between its component event 
occurrences fulfill that constraint.        
The introduction of parameter contexts adds another perspective to the detection of 
composite events and solve the problem of the management of multiple occurrences of 
the same primitive event. The selection of this parameter states which component 
event occurrences play an active part in the detection process. The use of parameter 
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contexts (Recent, Chronicle, Continuous, Cumulative) makes the detection mechanism 
versatile and flexible, with respect to different classes of applications: 
 when the events happen at a fast rate and multiple occurrences of the same 
type of event only refine the previous detection;  
 when there is a causal dependency between different types of events and their 
occurrences;  
 when composite event detection along a moving time window needs to be 
supported;  
 when all occurrences of constituent events are meaningful up to the occurrence 
of  a deadline event.  
According to the features of the application and to the objectives to fulfill, it is 
possible to select a consumption mode tailored to the needs. Once the occurrences are 
selected and used in the process of composite event detection, they are managed 
according to the following policies:  
 recent: when the composite event is detected, all the component occurrences 
that cannot be initiators of that event in the future are flushed;  
 chronicle: once used, all the occurrences of the constituent events cannot 
participate in any other occurrences of the composite event;  
 continuous: a terminator event occurrence can cause the detection of one or 
more occurrences of the same composite event;  
 cumulative: once used, all the occurrences of constituent events are flushed. 
The main difference between the chronicle and the continuous contexts is that, in the 
former, for each initiator event there is a single terminator event, while in the latter 
multiple initiators can be paired with a single terminator [18]. To better understand the 
effect of each parameter context on the same composite event detection, it is possible 
to show the detection process on a timeline.  
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Figure 14 – Composite event detection in different contexts  
Given a chronology of primitive event occurrences, the Figure 14 shows an example 
of detection of the composite event X = (((E1 AND E2) SEQ E3) SEQ(E2 AND E4)). 
The occurrences of each En event are denoted by en
c
 , where:  
•  n is associated to the event type;   
•  c is associated to the occurrence number.    
The figure highlights the pairing mechanism between initiation and terminator events 
and how different instances of the same composite event are detected, given the 
sequence of primitive event occurrences and a specific parameter context.  
An additional feature of the detection mechanism is the management of alarm levels, 
which the user can associate to a specific operator node, i.e. to a sub-tree, if he/she 
wants to detect the occurrence of such sub-tree. As mentioned in section 3.2,  
DETECT allows to associate an alarm level (different from 0) to each composite 
event, which should be signaled by the detection engine. In this way the user can be 
aware of the threat scenarios since their first evolution steps. Through such feature, the 
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matching with known event trees to be recognized (stored in the Scenario Repository) 
can be also partial. Therefore, DETECT is able to detect whole threat scenarios and/or 
their parts, significant for the end-user, which require the early adoption of 
countermeasures, according to the evolution phase of the threat. Obviously, the type of 
countermeasure corresponds to the a-priori defined alarm level.   
In the operational phase, when a composite event is recognized, the output of 
DETECT consists of:  
 the identifier(s) of the detected/suspected scenario(s)4;  
 the temporal value related to the occurrence of the composite event 
(corresponding to the occurrence time of the terminator, given by the sensor 
timestamp); 
 an alarm level (optional), associated to scenario evolution (used as a progress 
indicator and set by the user at design time); 
 the identifiers of the primitive event occurrences, which led to the detection in 
object;   
 other information depending on the detection model and/or on the sensors 
involved in threat detection (e.g. ‘likelihood’ or ‘distance’). For further details 
see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.    
 
3.4 General architecture   
This section presents the general architecture of DETECT, describing its component 
modules, their functionalities and their connections. The detection mechanism is 
mainly graph-based, according to the Snoop event algebra [17][18]. More specifically, 
in the described implementation, each graph is reduced to a tree. Therefore, the basic 
working logic follows the detection mechanism described in section 3.3, operating on 
                                                 
4
 The difference between detected and suspected scenario depends on the partial or total matching 
between the real-timeevent tree and the stored threat pattern.  
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the Event Trees which are composed with the EDL described in section 3.2. However, 
in order to achieve a more general architecture, within the design of DETECT, the 
representation of threat scenarios and the translation into detection models are 
separated from their resolution algorithms. So, the system is predisposed to manage 
different detection models and, for each of them, possibly different resolution 
mechanisms (if applicable). This aspect enhances in a significant way the flexibility of 
the system for future developments. 
 
 
Figure 15 – DETECT architecture 
The framework is made up by the following main modules (see Figure 15):  
 Event History, that is database containing the list of occurrences of basic 
events detected by sensors, tagged with a set of relevant attributes including 
detection time, event type, sensor id, sensor type, sensor group, etc. (some of 
which can be optional). Since external sources (like a PSIM system) may 
populate the database, or a software bus may “virtually” represents the 
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chronology of the Event History, it is depicted with dotted line. Anyway the 
minimal set of attributes which should characterize each occurrence of 
primitive events (in such a way to perform the correlation as described in the 
previous sections) has already been  specified in Table 1. If necessary, a 
specific external Events Adaptor Module could aim to fill, in the right format,  
the Event History with the occurrences coming from the sensor network on the 
field. 
 Detection Engine, supporting both deterministic (e.g. Event Trees) and 
heuristic models, sharing the primary requirement of real-time solvability. For 
each Detection Model there is a Model Feeder which instantiates the inputs of 
the engine according to the nature of the models by performing proper queries 
and data filtering on the Event History (e.g. selecting sensor typologies and 
zones).  At the moment, the detection engine is only based on the deterministic 
model of the event trees, which are automatically fed whenever a new event 
occurrence is in the Event History.   
 Model Solver, that is the existing or specifically developed tool used to execute 
the model. It implements the logical assumptions to solve the Detection Model, 
based on the inputs coming from the Model Feeder, therefore it is the 
responsible module for the composite event detection. We have implemented 
our own Model Solver based on the event trees Detection Model. 
 Model Executor (one for each model), which triggers the execution of the 
mode, once it has been instantiated, by activating the related solver. An 
execution is usually needed at each new event detection. 
 Model Updater (one for each model), which is used for on-line modification of 
the model (e.g. update of a threshold parameter), without regenerating the 
whole model (whenever supported by the modeling formalism). 
 Output Manager (single), which stores the output of the model(s) and/or 
passes it to the interface modules. 
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 Scenario GUI (Graphical User Interface), used to draw threat scenarios using 
an intuitive formalism and a user-friendly interface. Once a scenario has been 
built, it will be converted in a XML document by the XML File Generator 
module and then indexed in the Threat Scenario Repository. In this way we 
are able to store permanently all scenario features in a formal way as well as to 
facilitate possible subsequent data processing by other applications. In the 
opposite way, when the user selects the threat scenario he/she wants to detect 
from the repository, the XML document which contains its description has to be 
re-converted in the detection model, which represents the composite event 
related to the scenario. This task is carried out by the Model Generator which 
recovers the original graph and its parameter by parsing the related XML 
document. 
 Event Log, which is kept to gather all information about detected events 
(detection time, alarm level, instances of component events involved in the 
composite event detection process, and further information like “alarm 
reliability” and “distance” with respect to other items of Threat Scenario 
Repository, see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). Detected alarms could be also sent to 
existing PSIM systems in order to trigger adequate countermeasures.  
 
3.5 Advantages and limitations 
DETECT can be used as an on-line decision support system, by alerting in advance 
PSIM system operators about the likelihood and nature of the threat, as well as an 
autonomous reasoning engine, able to guide the activation of  response actions. The 
latter include, for example, audio and visual alarms, emergency calls to first 
responders, air conditioning flow inversion, activation of sprinkles, etc. The DETECT 
architecture is inherently suited to many application domains: not only CIP and HS, 
but more in general all the fields like environmental monitoring and control [34]. The 
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framework is being experimented in railway transportation systems, which have been 
demonstrated by the recent terrorist strikes to be among the most attractive and 
vulnerable targets. Real threat scenarios include intrusion and drop of explosive in 
subway tunnels, spread of chemical or radiological material in underground stations, 
combined attacks with simultaneous multiple train halting and railway bridge 
bombing, etc. DETECT has proven to be particularly suited for the detection of such 
articulated scenarios, using a modern PSIM platform, in turn based on an extended 
network of cameras and sensing devices (see Chapter 7). 
The use of a simple formalism (apparently not powerful, with respect to other), based 
on Event Tree models, makes light, efficient and easy-to-use the whole approach. 
Such features are crucial to assure the usability of DETECT and to satisfy the 
requirements described in section 2.1 (like the real-time solvability of the correlation 
models). At the same time, the tool doesn’t ask for a modeling expert to draw event 
trees, given their intuitiveness. Accordingly, this helps in making the models easy to 
update and integrate by the security operators, reducing and simplifying the 
maintenance effort as well. The same considerations are not valid for more powerful 
formalisms (e.g. ANN, Petri Net), which are far from being straightforward to 
implement, control and update. However, the general architecture of the framework is 
suitable to accommodate different detection models, which could be used in parallel 
with the event trees. With respect to traditional approaches of infrastructure 
surveillance, DETECT allows for: 
 A quick and focused response to emergencies, which could be fully automatic 
or dependent on human supervision and intervention. A semi-automatic 
approach may represent the right trade-off, since human management of 
critical situations, possibly involving many simultaneous events, is a very 
delicate task. Furthermore, it can be error prone as well as subject to forced 
inhibition. 
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 An early warning of complex threat scenarios since their first evolution steps 
using the knowledge base provided by experts during the qualitative risk 
analysis process. This allows for  preventive reactions which are very unlikely 
to be performed by human operators given the limitation both in their 
knowledge base and vigilance level. Therefore, a greater situational awareness 
can be achieved. 
 An increase in the Probability Of Detection (POD) while minimizing the False 
Alarm Rate (FAR), due to the possibility of logic as well as temporal 
correlation of events. While some PSIM software offer basic forms of logical 
correlation of alarms, the temporal correlation is not implemented in any 
nowadays systems, to the best of our knowledge (though some vendors provide 
basic options of on-site configurable “sequence” correlation embedded in their 
multi-technology sensors). 
On the other hand, the main limitations of the framework are inherently linked to the 
introduced deterministic approach, where completeness and correctness of the 
knowledge base depend on the quality of the Risk Analysis. Therefore, the search for 
an exact matching with the items of the knowledge base should be extended (alarm 
level management is not enough). In addition to that, there is a lack of awareness 
about alarm credibility and likelihood, that is crucial to understand priority of 
intervention and react consequently.  A probabilistic approach should complement the 
deterministic one to manage also the uncertainty coming from all the information 
sources (single sensors, multimodal monitoring systems, integrated surveillance 
systems, as well as detection and correlation models). Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
describe how to improve the detection effectiveness and efficiency.    
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Chapter 4  
Heuristic detection of threat scenarios with Event Tree 
distance metrics 
 
4.1 Problem statement 
The following section introduces an extension of the described event correlation 
approach with event tree similarity analysis capabilities. It enables an earlier and more 
robust recognition of threat scenarios, due to the possibility of detecting sequences of 
events with a non perfect matching, as well as an increased tolerance to sensor and 
modeling faults.   
In the context of situation recognition, a common technique to address that issue is the 
graph matching. It usually based on the extraction of a relational structure from the 
graph and on the comparison of the extracted structure with a set of stored structures 
of interest for the application to find the best match [75]. However, graph matching 
problems are typically NP-complete, thus the related algorithms have problems with 
performance [76]. In fact, in the worst case, the time required to execute the 
algorithms increases exponentially with the size of the graphs. Therefore, this aspect 
reduces the field of application of many techniques based on graph matching. 
Algorithms with lower complexity have been studied, but they often introduce several 
constraints to fulfill (e.g. topological restrictions to the compared graphs). In addition 
to the complexity, further problems include the difficulty in representing and 
recognizing situations and relations, which may also have temporal constraints. 
Therefore, graph matching techniques are often used only for forensic applications and 
post-event analysis.  
The techniques based on similarity between graphs, representing threats and attacks, 
are not new in particular in the field of computer network, where a similar issue to the 
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one addressed in this section is to recognize threats even in the case of missing events. 
A widespread solution in network intrusion detection systems is the following. If an 
alert, which is the known consequence of a forerunning event, is received by the 
correlation engine and if the forerunning event has not been detected, then the missed 
event can be identified. However such a solution has an intrinsic limit: it cannot cope 
with missing events that are not linked to other events.  
The approach described in the following differs from all these techniques and it is 
consistent with the indications of section 2.1. It does not require: a) to satisfy 
constraints on size or topology of the event trees, b) direct cause/consequence 
relationships between detected and missing events, since it is based on ad-hoc metrics. 
The latter allow for a heuristic recognition of similarities between event trees. The 
analysis can be performed both at the insertion time of a new detection model into the 
engine (off-line mode), and at the run time of the engine (on-line mode). To the best of 
our knowledge, no existing physical security monitoring system features a scenario-
based heuristic detection approach, like the one described in this chapter. With respect 
to traditional approaches of infrastructure surveillance, the framework enriched by this 
extension allows for a more robust and straightforward early warning of complex 
threat scenarios, and a more rational use and management of the knowledge base 
provided by risk analysts. 
 
4.2 Definition of distance metrics 
The approach requires the definition of ad-hoc metrics distances. As stated in Chapter 
3, each event tree consists of basic events (the ones detectable by each sensorial 
subsystem) and the connectors used to associate them (to express logic, spatial or 
temporal relationships). The former are the leave nodes, the latter are the internal 
nodes of the event tree. Furthermore, it is possible to specify additional attributes, 
related to the whole tree (e.g. the parameter context) or its nodes (e.g. to set the type of 
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connector, temporal constraints, etc.). That is the reason why a complete comparison 
between event trees should involve, in addition to the structure (to find a possible 
isomorphism), also the above mentioned attributes. Therefore, it is necessary to define 
appropriate metrics to evaluate the distance between event trees, in terms of  event 
trees structure (e.g. number of nodes), attributes of nodes (e.g. event type for leaves 
nodes; connector type for internal nodes) and attributes of trees (i.e. the parameter 
contexts). More formally, the following attributes can be associated to Event Trees (in 
the form of positive integer numbers): 
1. TN: total number of nodes 
2. TD: tree depth, that is the number of levels from leaves to the top node 
3. TW: tree width, that is the maximum number of operators at the same level 
4. SL: set of leaf nodes 
5. SO: set of operator nodes 
Though other attributes (e.g. number of arcs) could be associated to event trees, the 
ones listed above picture a comprehensive yet not redundant set of characteristics. 
While a theoretical demonstration could be possible, such a statement has been 
validated experimentally. For instance, the number of arcs in all the significant 
scenarios included in the repository was always dependant on the number of nodes. 
In order to obtain an easy to compute metric, the distance between two event trees is 
obtained as the sum of the differences between homologous attributes. In other words, 
the distance D among event trees A and B is obtained as follows: 
ABABBABABA DSODSLTWTWTDTDTNTND   
(+ 1 if parameter contexts are different) 
The quantities DSL and DSO are computed as set differences (card competes the 
cardinality of the set): 
)()( BABAAB SLSLcardSLSLcardDSL   
)()( BABAAB SOSOcardSOSOcardDSO   
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It is quite obvious that such a heuristic distance metric can be applied to any couple of 
event trees, regardless of possible isomorphism
5
. 
 
4.3 Implementation in DETECT 
In order to compute tree attributes, an appropriate algorithm has been implemented in 
DETECT. Starting from the root node, the whole tree is scanned and each node is 
saved in a table where each row represents a tree level (see Figure 16). For each node, 
the name of the father node is saved as well as the list including the names of the son 
nodes. In the end of the scan, all the information relevant for tree attributes 
computation will be available. Hence the formula to obtain the distance between any 
couple of trees can be easily computed. Off-line distance calculation is very useful 
when inserting a new event tree in the Scenario Repository. In fact, when a human 
operator finishes building the event tree and saves it in the repository, he/she can see 
all the distances (possibly only the ones lower than a certain threshold) with all the 
other event trees in the repository. Therefore, if another tree exists whose distance 
from the new one is very low, then it is possible the two trees represent the same threat 
(or similar threats) and therefore could be somehow merged to reduce multiple 
warnings and improve usability as well. 
                                                 
5
 Two trees are isomorphic when they are identical in graph structure (they could differ in node 
attributes).  
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Figure 16 – An example of table obtained from an event tree  
For on-line calculation, the distance needs to be computed bottom-up starting from 
subtree attributes, which will be associated at run-time to each node (see Figure 17). 
Due to the working logics of DETECT, some limitations hold for the run-time 
computation of tree attributes (e.g. the TD metric cannot be computed at run-time). 
More specifically, since operator nodes can be considered as the roots of the subtrees 
below them, it is possible to associate to operator nodes the attributes of the subtrees 
below them. Hence, moving from the leaves to the root and exploiting the already 
computed attributes, each operator node will be associated to updated attributes 
representing all the tree structure below it. Therefore, the root node will include the 
overall attributes of the whole tree. When a subtree is detected and its alarm level in 
DETECT is greater than 0, its attributes are compared with the ones of all the other 
event trees in the Scenario Repository. If the distance D with another threat scenario T 
is lower than a configurable threshold DT , then a warning is generated and shown to 
the PSIM human operator, in order to warn him/her about the risk that threat T is 
occurring. It is obviously possible to associate different warning levels to different 
distances (the lower the distance metric, the highest the warning level); however, in 
practical applications it is important to keep the system simple to understand to 
operators. Therefore, we have decided to use a single threshold and a single warning 
level. An application example of the heuristic approach is introduced in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 17 – Example of on-line subtree attributes computation 
 
4.4 Benefits and practical implications   
The described technique allows to achieve several important results. In off-line mode, 
the approach allows to provide an effective feedback to the experts responsible of the 
identification of threat scenarios, in the phase of Risk Analysis. In such a way, they 
are able to recognize and study possible classes of equality in the identified scenarios, 
not arisen before. Furthermore, DETECT allows to store in the Scenario Repository 
only the event trees actually corresponding to new patterns, since it detects possible 
redundancies when updating the Scenario Repository. The consequence is a global 
improvement of the knowledge base on which the correlation engine works. 
The same approach is applicable also during the phase of post-event analysis to 
support security operators. In fact, let us assume that a specific attack has already 
occurred in the monitored environment, but the integrated framework has not 
recognized it. That is probably due to a lack in the knowledge base. In other words, the 
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corresponding event tree representing the occurred threat scenario was not yet in 
Scenario Repository. If we know some information about the possible dynamic of the 
occurred scenario, we can also model it, define the related tree, and activate the 
correlation engine on the temporal window of interest (e.g. to detect suspicious 
behaviors and, consequently, identify the possible attackers). For example, we may be 
interested in quickly selecting all the multimedia streams of interest. Such a feature 
enhances the post-event forensic search of  traces of an attack scenario not previously 
stored in the Scenario Repository. The distance between the just defined tree and the 
already stored ones can provide useful indications regarding this kind of analysis.  
In on-line mode, DETECT has the responsibility of performing queries on the Event 
History for the real-time feeding of detection models and of recognizing the complex 
events stored in the Threat Scenario Repository. The ordinary working logic consists 
of verifying the matching between trees, step-by-step, each time a new basic event is 
taken from the Event History. Depending on the partial or total matching between 
event trees, the framework is able to report warning messages related to 
detected/suspected threat scenarios. In addition to that, exploiting the described 
approach, it is possible to extend the recognition capabilities of the framework. In fact, 
on-line heuristic detection also evaluates the similarity of the partial trees constructed 
on-the-fly (while the correlation engine runs) with the known event trees, stored in the 
repository. In this way, the system is able to show information regarding possible 
distances with respect to known event trees and to give useful warnings about possible 
threat scenarios to human operators. The existing “deterministic” approach is hence 
extended and the recognition is more robust to both imperfect scenario modeling, due 
to limitations in the human knowledge, as well as to possible missed detections by 
sensors, which are not 100% reliable. 
The further advantages of similarity matching lie in the inner early warning capability, 
not requiring further modeling efforts, since scenario matching is not required to be 
complete, nor exact. The operators can then evaluate, through the user interface, the 
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warning level of suspected threats, which is inversely proportional to the computed 
distances. The overall effect achieved is a higher level of security since the 
quantitative indications about unfolding scenarios allow operators to quickly 
undertake appropriate countermeasures.     
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Chapter 5  
Probabilistic evaluation of detection trustworthiness 
 
5.1 Problem statement 
Modern surveillance solutions for infrastructure protection are based on the integration 
of different sensing subsystems. Each subsystem can include a large number of 
diverse and/or redundant distributed sensors, which are in charge of detecting 
abnormal conditions or unwanted events in the monitored environment. The rational 
exploitation of the available sensing capabilities needs a proper management and 
processing of both the “modeled” and “captured” information together with the related 
uncertainty. Therefore, together with PSIM systems there is an increasing need for the 
appropriate management of parameters characterizing sensors performance [34] [37].  
Ideally, the sensors should detect only “real” alarms, that represent a true threat. 
However, many devices generate unnecessary warnings, which can be classified as 
false alarms or nuisance alarms. False alarms are due to events that should not cause 
an alarm, while nuisance alarms are generated when a legitimate cause occurs, but 
alarm activation is not due to a real threat. The same consideration is still valid for a 
sensing subsystem as a whole, i.e. including sensing devices and specific software for 
the processing of what they detect (e.g. intelligent video surveillance systems include 
cameras and video content analytics for the detection of events).   
The aim of this chapter is to describe the means to improve efficiency of situation 
recognition provided by DETECT, which are generically applicable in the PSIM 
context. Efficiency is to be intended at human-machine interaction level, by 
associating a level of trustworthiness to threat detection in order to allow human 
operators to be aware of alarm credibility and priority of intervention, and hence react 
consequently. 
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More in detail, we can evaluate the impact of the reliability of each sensor/subsystem 
on the reliability of the whole integrated surveillance system, in terms of POD 
(Probability of Detection) and FAR (False Alarm Rate) parameters. The first 
characterizes the effectiveness of a detection system, the second determines its 
operational viability [82][83]. The need for such an evaluation is especially important 
when integrated surveillance systems are extended by means of a correlation engine 
aimed at the automatic threat detection and situation recognition. In fact, in that case, 
the alarm activation is based on the correlation of different sensors output. 
Furthermore, the alarms can be sent to a control center and can involve the triggering 
of specific countermeasures, by means of a fully automatic (independent from human 
intervention) or partially automatic (based on human discrimination) procedures. 
In order to fulfill such an objective, the deterministic approach described in the 
previous chapters should be complemented by probabilistic ones. The latter are very 
popular in the scientific research, in particular to recognize situations as well as threats 
in uncertain environments. More in detail, the approach is based on the application of 
Bayes’ theorem, used to evaluate the degree of belief of a hypothesis H (i.e. an alarm 
activation), given observed data E (i.e. the event triggering the corresponding alarm 
has been observed). Therefore, the aim is not to perform a new inference, with respect 
to the deterministic approach, finding the most likely hypothesis between all the 
possible ones that may explain the empirical evidence. Instead, it consists of 
evaluating the trustworthiness of the inference provided by the deterministic approach, 
taking into account the uncertainty due to the sensors. In order to represent composite 
events, the formalism is based on a Bayes Network (BN).  
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5.2 Uncertainty in threat detection  
This section introduces an additional feature to quantify the uncertainty due to sensor 
false alarms. In particular it focuses on how to exploit the parameters describing the 
detection performance
6
 of the sensors, which are involved in physical security 
situation recognition. As mentioned above, the aim is to evaluate the trustworthiness 
of the inferred alarms.  
In order to associate a reliability level to event detection, it is possible to use a real-
time fuzzy correlation of sensor outputs using a Bayesian Network (BN). Such a 
probabilistic modeling formalism enables a fuzzy logic through the use of “noisy” 
logic gates, whenever the output is not deterministic, but associated with a certain 
probability [56]. 
Formally, let us define a detector as a sensor or a sensing subsystem which in relation 
to a certain event can provide two outputs:  
 TRUE – if the event has been detected; 
 FALSE – if not. 
Each detector can be associated to the following parameters:  
 POD = P(event detected | event occurred); 
 FAR = P(event detected | event not occurred).  
An analysis based on the POD of detectors can be used to compute the probability in 
threat recognition, while we build the related detection models. Therefore it is 
convenient at design-time, since the results can provide a guide to draw appropriate 
event trees and to support the choice and dislocation of detectors, with respect to the 
specific threats to be addressed. The main end is to reach a certain target in the 
probability of recognition a particular threat, before using its detection model at real 
time. Such an analysis is objective of another work and it is not described in this 
thesis. Let us to address a FAR based real-time analysis in the following.   
                                                 
6
 In this section we refer to detection performance, reliability and trustworthiness by meaning the same 
concept related to false alarm generation (i.e. false positive). 
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Assuming the use of AND logical operator in order to correlate the outputs of 
detectors, we can perform an analysis based on their FAR parameters and aimed at the 
calculation of alarms reliability in real-time. A synthetic indicator of such an 
evaluation can then be reported to human operators together with inferred alarms. To 
better understand the approach we proceed with an explanatory example.  
 
Detector ID Event ID FAR 
S1 E1 0.15 
S2 E2 0.10 
Table 2 – Probabilistic parameters of two possible sensors 
In the following, we assume using two detectors whose FAR is described in Table 2. 
With reference to the AND operator, we can model the alarm reliability through a 
simple Bayesian Network (see  Figure 18).    
 
 
Figure 18 – Example of BN modelling an AND logical operator 
The leaf nodes represent the occurrence of the alarms associated to the events Ex 
detected by Sx. The reliability of each alarm (Ex_Sx_Alarm_Rel) is calculated using 
the FAR parameter of the related detector. The corresponding formula is the 
following:   
 
E1_S1_AND_E2_S2_Alarm_Rel
True
False
98.5
1.50
E2_S2_Alarm_Rel
True
False
90.0
10.0
E1_S1_Alarm_Rel
True
False
85.0
15.0
E1_S1_Alarm
True
False
 100
   0
E2_S2_Alarm
True
False
 100
   0
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P(Ex_Sx is TRUE | Ex_Sx_Alarm has been generated) =  
= P(Ex_Sx_Alarm is not FALSE) = 1 − P(Ex_Sx_Alarm is FALSE) = 1 – FAREx_Sx    
 
The alarms reliability reported in the BN are represented in percentages. The CPT 
(Conditional Probability Table) of the AND node is reported in Table 3. 
 
E1_S1_Alarm_Rel E2_S2_Alarm_Rel E1_S1_AND_E2_S2_Alarm_Rel 
True True True 
True False True 
False True True 
False False False 
Table 3 – CPT of the AND node 
The following hypothesis holds: the alarm associated to the AND event is not 
considered reliable only if both the alarms associated to E1_S1 and E2_S2 events are 
not considered reliable. For example, it means that when S1 detects E1 correctly and 
S2 generates a false alarm in E2 detection, then the related AND event – which is 
triggered anyway – is classified as TRUE. However, by modifying the CPT properly 
we can consider a more conservative hypothesis: the alarm associated to the AND 
event is considered TRUE only if both the alarms associated to E1_S1 and E2_S2 
events are considered reliable. In the first case (shown in Figure 18) we have an AND 
alarm reliability of 98.5%, in the second one, we have a lower value (76.5%). 
Therefore, according to the protection strategy to be pursued, we can set the CPT of 
the AND node.  
 
5.3 Implementation in DETECT 
The theoretical discussion in the previous section is suitable for a simple application to 
the composite event detection described in Chapter 3. To evaluate in real-time the 
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trustworthiness of detected alarms, which correspond to composite events, the main 
issue is to reason on the applicability of the approach to the EDL operators (see  
section 3.2). In particular, understanding how to use the BN in all the possible cases is 
needed. On the contrary, once the composite events are detected, temporal constraints 
and parameter contexts of the EDL have no impact on this type of analysis.  
The real-time calculation of an OR alarm reliability is quite simple. In fact, OR alarm 
activation is concomitant with the single Ex_Sx alarm generated first. Considering the 
example of the previous section, the result is 85% or 90% depending on the case. The 
approach is easy to apply also to the other operators. In fact, in real-time analysis, the 
SEQ (sequence) operator can be treated as an AND. The sequence operator considers 
the temporal order of the constituent primitive events, however (once SEQ is 
occurred) that aspect is not significant anymore. From the viewpoint of such 
evaluation, we always have to consider that trustworthiness depends on the reliability 
of the two sensors, as it happens in the case of AND operator. It is quite obvious that 
the same way of reasoning can be extended to the case of ANY operator. In fact, it 
occurs when m out of n distinct events specified in its expression occur, regardless the 
temporal sequence. Therefore ANY(m,E1,E2,…,En), which is equivalent to the “m out 
of n” scheme, can be treated (once occurred) as an n-ary AND. Whatever the set of m 
distinct occurred events, the reliability of the m sensors that have detected them is the 
only significant item for the evaluation of ANY detection reliability. Accordingly, the 
BN associated in real-time to the ANY activation will be again the same, but with m  
branches.   
The effectiveness of the approach increases significantly when we consider more 
complex Event Trees. In those scenarios, when primitive events are detected by 
sensors, they feed detection models according to the scenario evolution. Thus, step by 
step, the BN related to each occurred subtree can be executed in real-time in order to 
get also the alarm reliability related to the inferred composite event.  
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Figure 19 – DETECT entry windows for operator and basic event parameters 
Finally, we can take into account also the uncertainty of the detection models used to 
recognize threat scenarios. More in detail, in order to consider a possible mismatching 
between a real threat scenario and its model, for each logical operator there is the 
possibility to set also a confidence index (named confidence modeling), which weighs 
the trustworthiness of the operator. In other words, at the design time of the detection 
model (i.e. the event tree and all the related parameters) the responsible can set the 
index of certain EDL operator to a probability value p in the range from 0 to 1 (1 is the 
default value representing no uncertainty). Hence, the occurrence of the logical 
condition represented by the EDL operator, will be True with a probability p weighted 
with the computed alarm reliability.  
All the input parameters of the nodes, introduced up to this point, can be entered in 
DETECT framework by means of proper windows of its GUI (see Figure 19). The BN 
computation for a composite event occurrence is performed only if it corresponds to a 
detected or suspected threat scenario
7
, and the FAR parameters of all the involved 
detectors are available (whereas the default value of confidence modeling of EDL 
operators is 1, if not specified by the user). Furthermore, the computation is fully 
automatic, embedded in the framework  and doesn’t require extra effort from the user. 
In the current implementation, DETECT takes into account only the less conservative 
version of the CPTs of the EDL operator nodes. The possibility to select one of the 
two modes (like described in the previous section) will be considered in the next 
developments.  
                                                 
7
 In case of occurrence of whole event trees or sub-trees with an alarm level different from 0. 
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5.4 Benefits and practical implications    
As stated in section 3.5, the main advantages of DETECT consist of an early warning 
of complex threat scenarios as well as an enhanced detection reliability, which include 
in particular the lowering of the False Alarm Rate in composite event detection. The 
latter is a direct consequence of logic, spatial and temporal correlation of events, 
detected by redundant and/or heterogeneous devices. Thanks to the described 
contribution is also possible to provide evidence of that, and to quantify the achieved 
“gain” (e.g. section 5.2 shows that AND correlation has a resulting FAR equal to 
1,5%, with respect to 10% and 15% of the single sensors).  
Furthermore, the trustworthiness evaluation is strategic in the interaction with a human 
operator and in the activation of countermeasures. Recent studies in PSIM context 
remark the importance of having tools that can identify, through a stream of device 
data, situations in real-time, as well as sort and prioritize them [79]. Therefore, the 
awareness of alarms credibility supports the decision on the priority of interventions. 
From this point of view, it is a delicate task for two reasons. From one side, we may 
have a fully or partial automated operating procedure, in order to react to the 
recognized situations. Since one or more steps are not confirmed by human operators, 
a basic requirement is to undertake a countermeasure only when there is the 
reasonable certainty that it is necessary.  
On the other side, whatever is the automatism of the response procedures, their 
execution should always be proper. For example, let us consider different response 
actions to an occurred threat scenario: opening specific exit gates and closing specific 
entrance gates in a public area (e.g. for conveying a mass of people in a certain 
direction in case of emergency), sending security staff on the interested site, 
emergency calls to first responders, and so on. According to that, more critical is the 
countermeasure, more important is to assure that it is necessary. Thus, its activation 
could be confirmed only if the correspondent alarm reliability exceeds a certain 
threshold (e.g. specified by the end-user). That is a basic requirement to optimize the 
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impact of the protection efforts and to manage all the available resources efficiently. 
The fulfillment of these needs can have important practical implications, in terms of 
limited costs for the security and overall organizational efficiency, which is 
fundamental to assure an adequate protection level.      
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Chapter 6  
Applications in the railway and mass-transit domains 
 
6.1 Modeling of a threat scenario  
This section reports an example of application of the overall approach to a case-study 
in a metropolitan railway environment [33]. Historically, these mass transit systems, 
being easy to access public places, are vulnerable to many threats of various kind and 
seriousness. In fact, they can be theater of criminal acts, aggressions, vandalism as 
well as sabotages and terrorist strikes. The following is a description of how to detect 
complex scenarios of terrorist attacks by exploiting heterogeneous sensing devices.  
Modern smart-surveillance systems suitable for the protection of metro railways are 
made up by several non fully reliable sensorial subsystems. When single alarms are 
not reliable, automatic countermeasures cannot be activated and operators response is 
slowed down. Mechanisms of alarm correlation can contribute to reduce the FAR 
(False Alarm Rate) and at the same time improve the POD (Probability of Detection). 
Improvements in detection reliability can be achieved adopting two main techniques: 
redundancy and diversity. 
Through complex computer vision algorithms, the video analytics allows for the 
detection of events of different complexity, like intrusions in critical areas, abandoned 
objects [47], abnormal behaviors (person running or loitering, downfalls, etc) [50]. 
Since the detection of an event can suffer from the intrinsic reliability of the algorithm, 
as well as from issues due to environmental conditions (e.g. changes of lighting, 
presence of reflective materials, occlusions), redundancy in cameras dislocation can 
improve detection reliability and overall system resiliency against both accidental and 
intentional faults. For example, assuming the use of more intelligent cameras with 
overlapped views from different viewpoints to detect an abnormal behavior in a 
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platform, the events detected by each camera can be combined with a simple AND 
logic.  
However, the most interesting application of redundancy is when it is used in 
combination with diversity, by exploiting devices based on different technologies. In 
the assumption that the abnormal behavior includes screaming, which is detectable by 
means of appropriate audio sensors, the information coming from the microphone and 
the cameras installed in the platform can be combined using a more complex 
approach, based on the use of advanced logical and temporal operators.  
Let us suppose to address a chemical attack, similar to what happened in the Tokyo 
subway on March 20, 1995 using Sarin gas. Sarin is a chemical warfare agent (CWA) 
classified as a nerve agent. It is a clear, colorless, odorless, and tasteless liquid in its 
pure form, and can evaporate and spread in the environment very quickly.  
The current available technologies to identify the contaminated areas, for example 
include Ion Mobility Spectroscopy (IMS), Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW), Infrared 
Radiation (IR), etc. They are employed in ad-hoc standoff detectors and each of them 
is characterized by different performances. One of the most accurate device, the 
automatic scanning, passive, infrared sensor can recognize a vapor cloud from several 
kilometers with an 87% detection rate [25]. Thus, to improve sensitiveness and reduce 
the number of false alarms, different technologies are often integrated in the same 
standoff detector (for example, the IMS and SAW detection are typically combined). 
More in general, it is possible to combine heterogeneous detectors and to correlate 
their alarms (e.g. IMS/SAW and IR detectors), in such a way to get an early warning 
system for the detection of chemical agents. Exploiting the redundancy and diversity 
also of these devices, increasingly complex correlations (logic, temporal, and spatial) 
can be implemented.   
A likely scenario consists of a simultaneous drop of CWAs in many subway platforms 
in the rush hour. Let us suppose that dynamic of events is the following:  
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1. the attackers stay on the platforms, waiting for the simultaneous drop of 
CWA;  
2. the first contaminated people fall to the floor;  
3. the people around the contaminated area run away and/or scream;  
4. the CWA quickly spread in the platform level and reach the escalators to the 
concourse level.  
In each subway site, it is possible to address the attack scenario by means of two 
intelligent cameras positioned at platform end walls, a microphone between them, two 
standoff detectors for CWAs positioned on the platform and on the escalator.  
The scenario can be formally described by means of the notation “sensor description 
(sensor ID) :: event description (event ID)”:  
Intelligent Camera (S1) :: Fall of person (E1) 
Intelligent Camera (S1) :: Abnormal running (E2) 
Intelligent Camera (S2) :: Fall of person (E1) 
Intelligent Camera (S2) :: Abnormal running (E2) 
Audio sensor (S3) :: Scream (E3) 
IMS/SAW detector (S4) :: CWA detection (E4) 
IR detector (S5) :: CWA detection (E4) 
Given the scenario described above, the composite event drop of CWA in platform 
can be represented by the event tree in Figure 20, built using the DETECT framework.  
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Figure 20 – Event tree associated to “drop of CWA in platform” by using DETECT 
Please note that single events detected by intelligent cameras do not represent 
necessarily a threat situation. In the approach we are describing, a low alarm level 
(e.g. to 1) can be associated to the OR operators. 
A partial alarm level (e.g. 2) can be associated to the scenario evolution in case of 
occurrence of the ANY event (at the left of tree). The m parameter of ANY is set to 2 
(trough the Scenario GUI) , this means that when 2 out of 3 distinct events detected by 
intelligent cameras and/or microphone occur, the monitored situation is considered 
abnormal (in fact each of the single events: person who falls, runs or scream, can not 
represent a meaningful state of alert). Besides, a temporal constraint can be set on 
ANY operator, in such a way to catch real alarm conditions: e.g. if fall and scream are 
detected at a distance of time of 30 minutes, that could not represent an alert condition 
for the specific scenario. In the specific example, it could be set to 5 minutes to take 
into account the latency of both gas propagation and intoxication symptoms.  
An higher alarm level (e.g. 3) can be associated to the scenario evolution in case of 
occurrence of SEQ event (at the right of tree). The use of the sequence operator is due 
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to the different assumed locations of the CWA detectors: IMS/SAW detector at 
platform level, IR at escalator or concourse level, in such a way to detect correctly the 
spread of CWA. If IR detector gives a warning before the one based on IMS/SAW 
detection, this could be an abnormal condition due to a false alarm and should not 
cause the activation of a warning. To further avoid false alarms, also a temporal 
constraint should be set. In this case, it can be set to 10 minutes to be conservative 
while taking into account the movement of air flows between different environments.  
The detection of the whole threat scenario is associated to the AND occurrence. Its 
alarm level is set to 4. Finally, it is necessary to set the parameter context to regulate 
the consumption mode of the occurrences of events in feeding the detection engine. In 
this case, the assumption is that only the most recent occurrence of each event is 
meaningful. Thus, parameter is set to “recent context”.  
The use of many alarm levels is strategic to trigger countermeasures properly: e.g. the 
alarm level 2 can trigger the opening of the turnstiles; at level 3 an appropriate 
ventilation strategy can be activated; finally, the detection of the whole composite 
event can be associated to actions like: evacuation message from public address, stop 
trains from entering the station, and emergency call to first responders [31][33]. 
 
6.2 Distance metrics computation  
In this section we report some examples of evaluation of attributes and distance 
metrics, as described in Chapter 4, for reference threat scenarios [31]. The first 
scenario we consider is the Chemical Attack (scenario A) by means of a CWA 
(Chemical Warfare Agent), which we have already described in section 6.1, whose 
event tree is depicted in Figure 21 together with a table including its attributes. 
The same scenario could be represented in other way using the model of Figure 22 
(scenario B), featuring slightly different attributes. 
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Figure 21 – Event tree attributes for the Chemical Attack scenario 
 
 
Figure 22 – Event tree attributes for another version of the Chemical Attack scenario   
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The two scenarios of Figure 21 and Figure 22 feature the same primitive events (i.e. 
the trees have the same leaves) and therefore the SL distance is 0. Instead, the sets of 
operators differ by 1. Overall, the distance is given by: 
 
D = |12−10| + |3−3| + |2−1| + 0 + 1 = 4 
 
Now, let us consider a scenario of pickpocketing/aggression (scenario C), which could 
partially overlap with the previous one regarding people behaviour, since it features 
the composite event represented by the ANY operator included in scenario B.  
Furthermore it is similar to the corresponding ANY in scenario A. Please refer to 
Figure 23, where E5-S6 represents an alarm coming from the emergency call point. 
 
Figure 23 – Event tree attributes for the Pickpocketing/Aggression scenario 
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 A-B A-C B-C 
∆TN 2 4 2 
∆SL 0 3 3 
∆TD 0 1 1 
∆SO 1 2 1 
∆TW 1 1 0 
D 4 11 7 
Table 4 – Differences among attributes of scenarios A, B and C  
An overview of distances among attributes of event trees representing scenarios A, B 
and C is reported in Table 4. 
As an example, in off-line operation, when inserting scenario B after A and C, the 
human operator sees the distances with scenarios A and C. In this case, he/she will be 
aware of the similarity with scenario A, since the distance is low (e.g. DT could be set 
to 5) and could decide to keep only the original version (i.e. scenario A) since the 
variation would be automatically detected by the on-line heuristic engine based on 
distance. 
In on-line operation, let us assume the ANY event of scenario A is detected. The 
expected behaviour will be as follows. 
1. DETECT computes the attributes associated to the ANY composite event 
subtree (see below). 
TN 8 
TD 2 
SL E1-S1, E2-S1, E1-S2, E2-S2, E3-S3 cardinality=5 
SO ANY, OR cardinality=2 
 
2. DETECT computes the distances with all the (enabled and full) event trees in 
the Scenario Repository (see D row below). 
 ANY-A ANY-B ANY-C 
∆TN 4 2 0 
∆SL 2 2 1 
∆TD 1 1 0 
∆SO 2 3 1 
D 9 8 2 
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The computed distances correctly represent the recognised situation that, though 
formally belonging to scenario A, in absence of chemical warfare agent detection, is 
more similar to a situation of aggression/pickpocketing.  
Given the possibility to get additional, but still appropriate warnings on possible 
forthcoming threats, the on-line operation is strategic to enrich the detection 
capabilities of the existing deterministic correlation engine. In particular, the described 
recognition technique addresses the imperfect threat modeling, due to human faults, as 
well as the possible missed detections, due to sensor faults. 
 
6.3 Real-time evaluation of alarm reliability  
A practical application of the approach presented in Chapter 5 is the following. Let us 
consider the chemical attack scenario already addressed in the previous section 
(scenario A), which describes the drop of a CWA in a metro railway platform, 
represented by the event tree Figure 21. The scenario is built considering two 
intelligent cameras positioned at platform end walls, a microphone between them, two 
standoff detectors for CWAs positioned on the platform and on the escalator or 
concourse level. Let us assume to characterize the involved detectors with the FAR 
parameters reported in Table 5. 
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Detector 
ID 
Detector 
Description 
Event ID 
Event 
Description 
FAR 
S1 
 
Intelligent 
Camera 
E1 Fall of 
person 
0.25 
E2 Abnormal 
running 
0.20 
S2 
 
Intelligent 
Camera 
E1 Fall of 
person 
0.25 
E2 Abnormal 
running 
0.20 
S3 Audio 
Sensor 
E3 Scream 0.15 
S4 IMS/SAW 
detector 
E4 CWA 
detection 
0.30 
S5 IR detector E4 CWA 
detection 
0.27 
Table 5 –  FAR parameters of detectors used in chemical attack scenario 
A possible set of basic event occurrences corresponding to a real CWA attack is listed 
in Table 6, which includes chronological aspects like the ones used in real PSIM log-
files. 
Date Time Event ID  Detector ID  Occurrence Nr   
01/04/2012 09:11:11 E4 S4 1 
01/04/2012 09:14:18 E1 S2 2 
01/04/2012 09:15:51 E3 S3 3 
01/04/2012 09:16:00 E2 S2 4 
01/04/2012 09:17:07 E4 S5 5 
Table 6 – A possible basic events chronology related to the CWA attack 
When using DETECT to model the threat scenario (whose ID is assigned - for 
example - 241), with the Event Tree of Figure 21 and the parameters of Table 5, the 
output is reported in the screenshot in Figure 24: for each detected event, also the 
reliability level is reported, which is calculated in real-time using the BN approach. In 
the described example we have considered no uncertainty coming from the detection 
model (the confidence index of each operator used to build the event tree is set to its 
default value, i.e. 1). 
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Figure 24 – Screenshot reporting alarms and their reliability values in real time 
The real-time execution of the BN models also enables the possibility of using 
‘dynamic’ FAR parameters, continuously updated using the feedback of the human 
operators in terms of confirmation of the alarms detected in the real on-the-field 
operation. In other words, for each event detected by a sensor, the statistical analysis 
of the ratio (‘false positive alarms’ / ’total number of alarms’), can lead to a proper 
update of FAR parameters and therefore to more reliable estimations with respect to 
the ‘static’ ones. 
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Chapter 7  
Integration of DETECT with a PSIM system 
 
7.1 Basic motivations 
Physical security is ensured by monitoring and protecting users and the physical assets 
of a certain infrastructure (e.g. in a railway context, it includes stations, bridges, 
tunnels, ventilation shafts, depots, etc.). To that aim, PSIM systems (like the one 
described in [13]) are becoming a popular choice to integrate several heterogeneous 
sensing platforms. A typical PSIM system is distributed and its mission is to detect the 
relevant events occurring in the peripheral sites and eventually alert the operators in a 
Security Control Center, support the execution of the emergency procedures and/or 
activate automatic reactions. Since the PSIM system may generate a large amount of 
alarms which could overwhelm the personnel in charge of reacting to threats and 
suspicious events, in order to lower the false alarm rate and improve the detection 
reliability of threat scenarios, event correlation capabilities need to be integrated into 
the system. It is interesting to notice that, in several application domains (like the 
railway context), only a few intelligent surveillance systems effectively integrate and 
use event correlation. Some existing commercial products feature limited correlation 
capabilities, based on basic logic correlations, like in multi-technology detectors. 
Several reasons may motivate this matter of fact, including the need for light and 
efficient, and easy to use approaches in recognition of evolving situations based on a-
priori knowledge of threat patterns, which in turn could be easily updated and 
integrated also by the security operators: that is an objective which is far from being 
trivial to achieve [32]. 
Therefore, the integration of DETECT with an existing PSIM system can represent an 
important step towards the development of a single cohesive platform able to:  
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 overcome limitations and doubts related to the PSIM system (as described in 
section 1.1.2 and 1.4);  
 feature all the PSIM key capabilities (see Figure 2) and the added value they 
should provide, e.g. in terms of real-time data analysis and interpretation. 
The advantage lies in the possibility to interact with a single interface, which comprise 
all the necessary information (coming from multiple sensing subsystems), including 
the ones related the occurrence of complex threats. The effectiveness of such an 
integration is twofold:   
 reduction of the warnings (specially the unnecessary ones) sent to human 
operators, by means of a filtering on the detected events;  
 prompt support in the activation of proper countermeasures.  
Since each sensing subsystem, integrated in the PSIM platform (like the VMS), is not 
100% reliable and the raised warning may not be significant or indicative of a real 
threat (and may not require a reaction), it is essential to report alarms only when 
strictly necessary or useful. The consequence is a simple, but effective support to the 
human operators in a control center. In fact, in the “standard” mode, each event/alarm 
detected by a sensing subsystem is reported to the operators (the possible aggregation 
of multiple events/alarms is thus performed at subsystem level and/or at junction box 
level). On the contrary, the PSIM system can be configured in the following way: 
standard mode only if the single event/alarm is critical and needs to be taken in charge 
by the operator immediately, otherwise the interface reports only aggregated alarms, 
i.e. the composite events recognized by DETECT. In turn, the latter can be filtered 
selecting the ones with “alarm level”, “alarm reliability” and “distance” above or 
below certain thresholds.  
The additional advantage of such an optimization consists of reducing the workload of 
human operators, which can be more concentrate and quicker in taking in charge 
critical events, using the right priority. At the same time, the early warning of more 
complex events is strategic in the early adoption of more punctual countermeasures.   
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7.2 An integrated framework for railway protection  
This section provides some details on the proposed integration between SMS (Security 
Management System) – developed by Ansaldo STS and used in railway transportation 
systems [13] – and DETECT. The objective is to enrich an existing PSIM system with 
basic, but effective reasoning capabilities.  
SMS integrates intrusion detection, access control, intelligent video-surveillance and 
intelligent sound detection devices. The system is able to integrate also CBRNe 
(Chemical Biological Nuclear Radiological explosive) sensors to improve detection of 
terrorist attacks.  
The SMS architecture (Figure 25) is distributed and hierarchical; a dedicated network 
provides reliable communication among the sites and an integrated management 
system collects the alarms and supports decision making.  In case of emergencies, the 
procedural actions required to the operators involved are orchestrated by the SMS. 
Data gathered from the heterogeneous sensing devices are processed by subsystems 
which generate the alarm events. Those alarms are first collected by peripheral control 
centers (Peripheral Security Places, PSP, e.g. positioned in the stations) and then 
centralized in a control center (Central Security Places, CSP, e.g. close to the traffic 
management center). Every security place (peripheral or central) can be provided with 
a SMS operator interface. 
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Figure 25 – SMS architecture 
The events detected by the available sensorial subsystems are stored in appropriate 
repositories, both at the PSPs and CSP sites, and then collected in an Oracle DB 
(which corresponds to the Event History considered for DETECT).  
In the integrated environment (see Figure 26), DETECT and SMS share the Event 
History database and communicate by exchanging warning messages (from DETECT 
to SMS) and possibly commands (from SMS to DETECT). The commands consist of 
specific feedback from human operators which can be used to refine or update the 
detection models handled by DETECT.   
Therefore, the working logic is the following. On the one hand, SMS collects all 
alarms detected by heterogeneous sensorial subsystems and store them into the shared 
database. On the other hand, the engine of DETECT is fed by each new entry in the 
Event History. The interface mode with the database is asynchronous (i.e. by event-
based queries, whenever a new event occurrence is stored in the Event History).  
98 
 
 
Figure 26 – Integration between DETECT and SMS by means of a shared database    
The DETECT alert messages are then reported on the SMS operator interface, which 
include a dedicated view of all the detected alarms. Therefore, such a view gives to the 
security personnel information about the composite event that has been detected, i.e. 
semantic indication about the recognized situation (explosive in tunnel, chemical 
attack, etc.) and current phase according to the scenario evolution. However, such a 
view doesn’t include detections with low alarm reliability (if available), according to 
predefined threshold.  
A possible issue to address is the following. If the detected scenario includes primitive 
events that have been already notified, SMS should drop them from the list of the 
alarms, after confirmation by the operator. The composite event can then be reported 
to the SMS interface. However the feature is not implemented in the current version.     
Furthermore, depending on the specific configuration required, primitive events can 
continue to be shown in a hierarchical or tree structured view of the SMS interface. 
According to the parameters of the threat scenario (e.g. criticality level, detection 
reliability), the DETECT alarm may activate specific SMS procedures that will 
override procedures, possibly associated with primitive alarms. In fact, featuring an 
intrinsic lower level of reliability, alarms from single sensors need to be verified more 
carefully by the operator, while composite events could even trigger automatic 
countermeasures.  
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Figure 27 – An example of operator interface of the integrated system 
Figure 27 shows an example of an operator interface including different screenshots of 
the integrated system. In particular, they show: the list of alarms with relative 
procedures (up), a vector graphics map which helps the operator to localize the source 
of the alarms (middle), the video streams automatically activated when an alarm is 
generated by smart-cameras or other sensors (down). 
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Figure 28 – List of SMS alarms including DETECT warning messages   
Figure 28 shows a detail of the list of alarms, which include the warning messages 
coming from DETECT. The first three rows of the list represent just a test performed 
to prove the correct acknowledgement of a: 
 deterministic detection of a whole composite event (denoted with 
“DETECTED EVENT”);  
 heuristic recognition of an event tree at low distance (denoted with 
“SUSPECTED TREE”); 
 deterministic detection of a part of a composite event (denoted with 
“SUSPECTED EVENT”).      
The proposed integration enables also an effective refinement process, based on the 
feedback of human operators (which confirm or not the alarms detected in the real on-
the-field operation), stored in the shared database. The processing of this information 
(e.g. for each event detected by a sensor, the statistical analysis of the ratio “false 
positive alarms” / “total number of alarms”) can lead to a proper update of FAR 
parameters and hence to a continuous update of the detection models used by 
DETECT. Therefore, exploiting dynamic parameters, in line with on-the-field 
indications, instead of the static values, the overall correlation process is more reliable.  
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Figure 29 – ESB-based integration between DETECT and SMS  
At the moment, the implementation of the integration is still in progress and we are 
moving towards a more advanced approach, consisting of a horizontal integration 
method. In fact, DETECT is configured for the data exchange with an Enterprise 
Service Bus (ESB), which implements the interaction and communication between 
mutually interacting software applications (like the ones of the single sensing 
subsystems) in a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). From this point of view, the 
ESB can collect on-the-field data and send them to DETECT via software, in such a 
way to feed its detection models (therefore, Event History is not a shared database, but 
an event queue handled by the ESB). Similarly, DETECT can send the recognized 
threat scenarios to the ESB, in order to display them into the interface of SMS / PSIM 
system. Such a solution provides more flexibility with regards to communication and 
interaction between applications, and bypass possible problems in the archiving of 
data in the shared Event History database. 
 
7.3 Detection of distributed attacks  
As stated previously, the SMS architecture is distributed and hierarchical. Thanks to 
the integration between DETECT and SMS, the same configuration can be repeated 
also for the DETECT architecture. The corresponding advantage makes possible the 
detection of simultaneous and distributed attack, which could not be recognized 
otherwise. In fact, only having a global view on the current status of all peripheral 
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sites, it is possible to consider specific critical events. As a matter of fact, although 
they may be unlikely and/or apparently not meaningful from a local viewpoint, they 
may assume a different and concrete importance from a global viewpoint. This is 
especially true in case of a simultaneous occurrence of the same event in more places.  
Assuming the simultaneous use of the correlation engine in each peripheral sites and 
in the main control center, it is possible to address strategic terrorist attacks (which 
often feature simultaneous strikes). In the CWA attack scenario considered in Chapter 
6, if the control center detects its simultaneous (possibly partial) evolution in different 
subway platforms, then the evacuation of the involved stations and the block of train 
traffic could be triggered immediately. This approach can enable an advanced 
situation awareness, early warning and decision support. Accordingly it is possible to 
improve the impact of countermeasures in a significant way. This is the key to detect 
and respond to different, but increasingly widespread typology of threat scenarios, 
which are very difficult to recognize. The hierarchical architecture of the integrated 
monitoring system, including both SMS and DETECT, is functional for this purpose.  
The implementation of such feature is quite simple with the available tools. In fact, on 
the one hand, the occurrence of a suspected threat scenario can be stored in the Event 
History (although it is not a primitive event occurrence), using the required format for 
the information encoding. On the other hand, the human operator can draw a new 
event tree (i.e. a sort of tree of trees), no longer fed by primitive events, but by 
composite events (or both of them).  
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Conclusions  
 
The proposed solutions in this thesis are mainly focused on the management strategy 
of all the available resources (provided by the state-of-art) and on how to augment the 
capabilities of distributed surveillance systems in PSIM (with respect to the state-of-
the-art), in order to better support security operators in responding to threats.  
A general paradigm of augmented surveillance has been proposed to analyze all the 
components (which identify features on different levels) to be included, and to 
establish how to assemble them. Furthermore a model-based event correlation 
approach has been proposed to support situation recognition task in real-time and in 
different applications, thanks to a light, efficient and easy-to-use technique. Such 
features are crucial to assure the usability of the developed framework, i.e. DETECT, 
a detection engine mainly based on a specific event algebra to build Event Tree 
models. In fact, the latter satisfy the real-time solvability requirement and, at the same 
time, don’t ask for a modeling expert to draw them, given their intuitiveness. 
Accordingly, this helps in making detection models easy to update and integrate by the 
security operators, reducing and simplifying the maintenance effort as well. The same 
considerations are not valid for more powerful formalisms (e.g. ANN, Petri Net), 
which are far from being straightforward to implement, control and update. However, 
the general architecture of the framework is suitable to accommodate different 
detection models, which could be used in parallel with the event trees.   
Further contributions of this thesis are aimed at overcoming specific limitations of the 
introduced deterministic approach. To enhance the detection effectiveness of threat 
scenarios in PSIM, an event tree similarity analysis and a real-time distance 
computation have been proposed. The extension has several important advantages 
including non-exact tree matching, which enables heuristic detection both on-line, to 
achieve early warning and tolerance to imperfect modeling and missed sensor 
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detections, and off-line, for a more rational use and management of the knowledge 
base provided by risk analysts. 
To address the problem of uncertainty management in threat detection with PSIM 
systems, an additional feature has been introduced to evaluate the trustworthiness of 
the inferred alarms, which is always limited since modeling errors and sensor false 
alarms. In order to associate a reliability level to the detected threats, a real-time fuzzy 
correlation of sensor outputs has been performed by means of a Bayesian Network. 
Therefore, the formalism has been employed to complement the deterministic 
detection with probabilistic parameters, which characterize the sources of uncertainty 
(mainly the sensors and detection models themselves). According to the availability of 
these parameters, simple BNs enable a fuzzy logic whenever the output of the 
detection engine is not deterministic, but associated with a certain probability. 
The decision making of the human operators is then supported by indications on 
suspected threat scenarios and related parameters (if available), like alarm level, 
detection reliability, and possible distances with other scenarios.  
In addition to that, the integration of DETECT with a PSIM system, on the one hand, 
allows to achieve a superior situation awareness also on complex threats, which could 
be difficult to recognize; on the other, it allows to focus on fewer, but more significant 
event notifications, as well as to better and quickly discriminate between false and real 
alarms. Human operators can then orient their behavior accordingly, guided by 
customized event management procedures, possibly automated on the basis of the 
computed parameters.   
We believe the main limitations of DETECT have been addressed and solved in a way 
that can be considered satisfactory to start using the framework in real surveillance 
applications. To that aim, we have already developed a set of threat scenarios relevant 
for metro railway contexts, some of which have been briefly addressed in this thesis 
for the case-study applications. We are presently finalizing the development of the 
integrated prototype, including DETECT and an existing PSIM system (i.e. the 
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Security Management System developed by Ansaldo STS), to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the approach in metro railway environments. 
Finally, we evaluating the possibility to define and implement ad-hoc techniques 
mainly aimed at the effective exploitation of PSIM operators’ feedback, for the 
extraction of relevant information during the correlation process (as indicated by the 
augmented surveillance paradigm), e.g. in order to adjust models or create new ones. 
At the same time, the automatic ‘learning’ of uncertainty parameters, analyzing the 
number of confirmed alarms, is fundamental for a continuous update and fine-tuning 
of DETECT knowledge base, according to the real observations.   
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